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2 The Role of Institutions in International Finance
Institutions are the “rules of the game” in economics. They set the parameters in which
economic activity takes place. Institutions come in many forms. They may be formal such
as constitutions, laws and regulations. They may be informal such as cultural norms, codes
of conduct and traditions.1 They also come at different levels of analysis. Williamson
(1998, 2000) identifies four such levels – the top level comprises the social embeddedness
level where informal institutions such as norms, customs, traditions, etc. are located; the
second level is dubbed the institutional environment and refers to the formal rules of the
game such as laws, bureaucracy, and property rights; the third level is referred to as play
of the game and concerns itself with governance structures related primarily to contractual
relations; finally, the fourth level contains the continuous and marginal resource allocation
and employment and is the domain of neoclassical economic analysis.
This thesis explores the role of institutions in international finance. In particular, it
considers institutions of the type 1 and 2 level – informal ones and the formal ones that
make up the institutional environment – and how they influence international capital flows
on the one hand and financial access across developing countries on the other hand. Each
of the following three chapters examines how a certain institution shapes in turn foreign
direct investment, international bank lending, and access to finance for firms.
Chapter 2 examines the role of immigrants as an informal institution in promoting
foreign direct investment (FDI). While the role of formal institutions such as the rule of
law, corporate governance, and financial sector development has featured prominently in
explaining international capital flow patterns,2 little consideration has been given so far
to the role migrant networks. An emerging literature on social networks suggests that,
similar to co-ethnic networks, migrant networks can help overcome information barriers to
international capital and trade flows and may so increase FDI flows to their country of ori-
gin. Because of the magnitude of migration flows in our time (see Hatton and Williamson,
2005) and given the surge in international capital flows in the last two decades (see Prasad
et al., 2007), understanding whether there is a discernible pattern between those two factor
flows is of great economic interest.
This chapter extends the evidence that more narrowly defined co-ethnic social networks
promote international investment to more general ethnic networks, namely migrant net-
works. Using a gravity model and panel data on 180 countries, it finds that immigrants and
FDI flows are complements in the context of Dutch data. In the preferred specification,
a 1 percent increase in the number of immigrants in the Netherlands increases the Dutch
1See North (1991)
2See, for example, Kose et al. (2006) and Prasad et al. (2007) for an overview.
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FDI stock in their country of origin by 1.08 percent. The effect is strongest for second
generation immigrants with one parent born abroad. A 1 percent increase in the number
of second generation immigrants with one parent born abroad increases the Dutch FDI
stock by 1.68 percent. Furthermore, keeping the total number of immigrants constant,
a 1 percent increase in the share of second generation immigrants with one parent born
abroad raises the Dutch FDI stock by an additional 0.1 percent. The sign and significance
of the immigrant variable is robust to a range of robustness checks though the size of the
coefficient does vary. Our robustness checks also suggest that countries may have to reach
a certain threshold level of governance quality for immigrants to play a significant role in
promoting FDI.
Chapter 3 examines the role of institution in promoting international bank lending
before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. In this chapter institutions are un-
derstood as measuring the effectiveness and stability of political, legal, and bureaucratic
circumstances in a country. As noted above, the role of institutions such as rule of law has
featured prominently in explaining international capital flow patterns. The chapter ex-
tends this literature specifically on international bank flows3 by studying the relationship
not only during periods of expanding international bank lending but also during a period
of sharp falls in such lending.
Using a panel of bilateral cross-border bank flows to up to 136 countries between 1984
and 2009 the results indicate that there appears to be an asymmetric relationship between
institutional quality and cross-border bank flows during periods of boom and bust in in-
ternational bank lending. The results confirm earlier findings in the literature that better
institutions promote cross-border bank lending in the years leading up to the financial
crisis. This includes the period of rapidly rising flows from 2003 to 2007, a period that
previously had not yet been studied in this context. The results, however, also indicate
that this relationship breaks down during and in the immediate wake of the financial crisis
of 2008. The positive relationship disappears in the overall sample, and, driven by flows
to high-income, high institutional quality OECD countries, indeed even turns negative.
This finding holds across a number of specifications and several robustness tests. Interest-
ingly, the relationship does not completely break down when only considering a sample of
emerging markets vis-à-vis countries. Emerging markets countries appear to still hold an
advantage in attracting cross-border bank lending flows. However, after the onset of the
crisis a better institutional environment only promotes international lending inflows at a
3See, for example, Alfaro et al. (2008) and Papaioannou (2009).
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quarter of its pre-crisis rate. The findings are the result of surveying the immediate effects
in the crisis and nascent recovery period. By necessity, the results are therefore tentative.
However, they do provide a first glimpse at the asymmetrical impact institutions can have
during boom and bust periods in international bank lending.
Finally, Chapter 4 explores the relationship between financial structure and access to
finance for firms across developing countries. Here the market structure of the financial
sector as shaped by legal rules and environmental circumstances sets the institutional
background for access to finance for firms. As small and medium enterprises make up a
large part of the emerging private sector in most developing countries but are also more
constrained in their access to financial services than large firms, the relationship between
financial structure and access to finance, especially for small and medium enterprises, is
a critical question for policy makers (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2007; Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005).
Combining two unique data sets, the chapter explores in particular how two measures
of financial structure – relative importance of different financial institutions as measured
by their asset share relative to total assets by financial institutions and average asset
size of financial institutions – relate to the three firm-level access to finance measures
use of account, overdraft facility or loan. Two findings stand out in the analysis of the
three financial institution categories considered. First, the dominance of banks in most
developing and emerging markets is associated with lower use of financial services by firms
of all sizes. Low-end financial institutions and specialized lenders seem particularly suited
to ease access to finance in low-income countries. Second, there is no evidence that smaller
institutions are better in providing access to finance. To the contrary, larger specialized
lenders and larger banks might actually ease small firms’ financing constraints, but only
at low levels of GDP per capita. The results, while tentative, send the policy message that
a diversified, competitive financial system is desirable.
Williamson (2010, p.611) notes in his overview of the state of new institutional eco-
nomics that “its many accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a vast amount of unfin-
ished business – refinements, extensions, new applications, more good ideas, more empirical
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Chapter 2
Do Immigrants Promote Outward
Foreign Direct Investment? Evidence
from the Netherlands1
1This chapter is based on joint work with Jenny Ligthart (Tilburg University). We are grateful for
comments from Thorsten Beck, Volker Nitsch, Manuel Oechslin, Maurizio Zanardi, seminar participants
at Tilburg University, and conference participants at the 65th Congress of the IIPF in Cape Town. We
thank Henk Prins of the Dutch Central Bank for making available the FDI data.
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2.1 Introduction
While the role of formal institutions such as the rule of law, corporate governance, and
financial sector development has featured prominently in explaining international capital
flow patterns,2 little consideration has been given so far to the role of informal institutions,
such as co-ethnic or migrant networks. In the context of foreign direct investment (FDI) the
long neglect is perhaps due to the assumption in some standard trade models of trade and
factor flows, including migration and FDI flows, being substitutes; either capital moves to
the workers or workers move to the capital and more of one leads to less of the other.3 An
emerging literature on social networks suggests that migrant networks can help overcome
information barriers to international capital and trade flows and so may actually increase
FDI flows to their country of origin. Migrants and FDI may in fact thus be complements.
The focus of this study is to provide an empirical underpinning of this relationship.
With his work on the Maghribi traders that operated in the Mediterranean region in the
11th century, Greif (1989 and 1993) has established that co-ethnic networks can promote
international trade and investment through the provision of community sanctions that de-
ter contract violations in weak legal environments. Gould (1994) and Rauch and Casella
(2003) stress that co-ethnic networks promote international trade and investment by re-
ducing agency and transaction costs. Their works emphasize the role such networks play
in providing and relaying information as well as supplying matching and referral services.
The provision of such services through networks significantly lowers the cost associated
with trading with or investing in foreign environments with a weak legal infrastructure.
Gao (2003), in the context of FDI into China, adds that this is also important in an
environment where foreign investors are to a high degree unfamiliar with the host coun-
try’s regulations, language, and customs. The literature on the role of co-ethnic networks
in promoting international trade and investment has particularly focused on the overseas
Chinese network. This is due in part to the sheer size and strength of the Chinese network
(see Rauch and Trindade, 2002) as well as China’s role in the world economy and the
paramount importance of interpersonal relationships for successfully conducting business
in China (Wang, 2001).4
2See, for example, Kose et al. (2006) and Prasad et al. (2007) for an overview.
3See for example Kugler and Rappoport (2011). Javorcik et al. (2011) note that depending on the
underlying assumptions regarding technology, factor endowment and mobility, trade and factor flows can
emerge as either substitutes or complements in the literature. Markusen (1986), for example, argues that
the assumption of substitutability is a special case of factor proportions models.
4Studying FDI flows into China, Gao (2003), for example, includes the size of ethnic Chinese net-
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The role of more generally defined ethnic social networks, however, such as immigrant
networks, has been under-researched. Yet, because of the magnitude of migration flows in
our time (see Hatton and Williamson, 2005) and given the surge in international capital
flows in the last two decades (see Prasad et al., 2007), understanding whether there is a
discernible pattern between those two factor flows – thereby extending the result of more
narrowly defined social networks to migrant networks in general – is of great economic
interest. Recent contributions in this field have been made by Javorcik et al. (2011)
and Kugler and Rapoport (2007), who both analyze the effect of immigrant networks on
outward FDI by the United States in a cross-country context.5 The results in the literature
have been mixed so far. Javorcik et al. (2011), who measure FDI both by total assets and
total sales for 1990 and 2000, do not find a significant effect of the total number of migrants
on country-level FDI.6 However, Kugler and Rapoport (2007), regressing US FDI outflows
on the stock of migrants, find a significant effect.
This chapter examines to which degree immigrants in the Netherlands determine the
outward FDI their country of origin receives using a unique data set for the Netherlands.7
To this end, we specify a gravity model that is augmented by the stock of immigrants in
the Netherlands to proxy the network effects on outward Dutch FDI (which is taken as a
stock rather than a flow). We also include a governance variable to assess whether there
is an effect of immigrants on FDI above and beyond the quality of institutions. The data
set employed in our study spans 180 host countries of FDI for the 1997–2006 period. To
address year-to-year volatility in FDI, we employ a panel data model based on two waves
of averaged data.
This chapter contributes to the literature by explicitly controlling for the selection bias
that is introduced by the small data sets used by previous studies. Unlike Javorcik et al.
(2011) and Kugler and Rapoport (2007), who use data sets consisting of roughly 50–60
countries, our data set has a much broader country coverage and includes many developing
countries that receive small amounts of FDI and send few migrants. Previous studies also
drop all countries for which FDI and/or migrant data are zero or not available. Because
works in the source countries as an explanatory variable in the regression analysis. In a related line of
research, Tong (2005) investigates the role of ethnic Chinese networks in facilitating FDI among 70 different
countries.
5In a closely related line of research Buch et al. (2006) examine the link between migration to and
FDI flows into Germany from the perspective of agglomeration.
6Once they disaggregate the FDI data by country and industrial sector, the estimated coefficient on
the migrant variable indicates that a 1 percent increase in migrants increases FDI by about 0.5 percent.
7The Netherlands is one of the major FDI source countries (UNCTAD, 2007) and has a substantial
population share of immigrants (19 percent in 2006).
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of the extensive country coverage, the Dutch data include a non-negligible number of
zero FDI observations (roughly 40 percent), which raises the issue of censoring. Standard
linear estimators cannot account for censoring, yielding a downward bias in estimated
coefficients. We therefore employ the more appropriate Tobit model.8 We also contribute
to the literature by testing whether the generational composition of immigrants has a
differential impact in promoting outward FDI and whether immigrant networks promote
outward FDI to a greater extent into countries with weaker institutions.
As suggested by the literature, we test for the potential endogeneity of the immigrant
variable. The presence of immigrants may increase FDI to their home country but FDI
could also hinder or encourage migration. In addition, we test for the potential endogeneity
of the governance variable, that is, the possibility that FDI may cause good governance
instead of good governance contributing to FDI. To control for endogeneity, we employ
an instrumental variables (IV) Tobit analysis. While these forms of reverse causality are
certainly plausible in an analysis that models aggregate FDI inflows, we are skeptical that
the FDI inflow from one country alone, particularly if it is small such as the Netherlands,
may actually increase emigration from or governance quality in the FDI recipient country.9
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We find that immigrants and country-level
FDI flows are complements at the aggregate level: a 1 percent increase in the number of
immigrants in the Netherlands increases the Dutch FDI stock in their country of origin
by 1.08 percent. The effect is strongest for second generation immigrants with one parent
born abroad. A 1 percent increase in the number of second generation immigrants with one
parent born abroad increases the Dutch FDI stock by 1.68 percent. Furthermore, keeping
the total number of immigrants constant, a 1 percent increase in the share of second gener-
ation immigrants with one parent born abroad raises the Dutch FDI stock by an additional
0.1 percent. Our results do not markedly change when we instrument immigration and we
do not find any evidence for the endogeneity of the governance variables. The sign and
significance of the immigrant variable in the panel Tobit framework is invariant to a range
of robustness checks. The results also suggest that countries may have to reach a certain
threshold level of governance quality for immigrants to play a significant role in promoting
FDI.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the empirical methodology.
8Javorcik et al. (2011) estimate a log-linear model by ordinary least squares (OLS). Kugler and
Rapoport (2007), however, use an OLS first difference specification.
9One could argue that endogeneity is more of a concern for the United States (which is the largest source
country of FDI) than for a relatively smaller but still significant source country, such as the Netherlands.
Indeed, Javorcik et al. (2011) find evidence of endogeneity for the United States.
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Section 2.3 discusses our data sources and section 2.4 presents the empirical results. The
chapter concludes with a summary of our findings and directions for future research.
2.2 Empirical Methodology
We start by motivating and presenting the empirical model we use to estimate the effect of
immigrants on the stock of outward FDI. We then discuss how we address censoring and
potential endogeneity in the data.
2.2.1 Empirical Model
To isolate the effect immigrants have on outward FDI we add a migrant variable to a
standard empirical specification of country-level outward FDI determinants. The literature
on determinants of FDI is “quite substantial, though arguably still in its infancy” (Blonigen,
2005, p. 29). The interaction of FDI and trade flows as well as the underlying motivations
for multinational firms to invest abroad makes analysis difficult.10 There are no agreed
theoretical models guiding the empirical analysis (see Singh and Jun, 1999; Bevan and
Estrin, 2000).11 Nevertheless, some stylized facts have emerged in the empirical literature
on country-level determinants.
The theoretical literature puts forward two reasons why a firm would want to invest
abroad. One is to take advantage of international differences in factor prices by splitting
the production process between several locations. This is referred to as vertical FDI and
was first modeled by Helpman (1984). The other, horizontal FDI, is to avoid transporta-
tion and other costs associated with cross-border trade by supplying a market directly
by an affiliate. Markusen (1984) provides an early model of FDI motivated by the latter
reason. The two motivations for FDI, however, give conflicting predictions about how
some country characteristics affect FDI. The theory of horizontal FDI predicts a positive
relationship between the volume of FDI and similarity in country characteristics between
source and destination countries, whereas the theory of vertically motivated FDI predicts a
negative relationship. Conflicting predictions also arise for trade costs: whereas the theory
10For a comprehensive overview on the theory of the behavior of multinational firms and determinants
of FDI see, for example, Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
11Table 1 in Chakrabarti (2001) tellingly illustrates this point. Looking at eight proposed determinants
of FDI the table lists studies according to whether they have found a positive, negative, or insignificant
relationship for each determinant. See his paper also for a review of host country FDI determinants.
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of horizontal FDI predicts a positive correlation, theory predicts a negative correlation for
vertical FDI (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
One way in which the literature addresses the problem of conflicting predictions is
to specify an empirical model that encompasses both theories.12 A model that accounts
for both vertical and horizontal FDI is the knowledge-capital model by Markusen (most
fully developed in Markusen, 1997, 2002)13 and estimated by Carr et al. (2001). The
model explains affiliate sales in terms of the sum of aggregate GDP proxying market size,
the squared difference between aggregate GDP, a measure of skill difference capturing
differences in labor costs, skill difference interacted with the difference in aggregate GDP,
and variables measuring trade costs and investment barriers. Note that affiliate sales
capture the same concept as FDI flows, namely the extent of operations a firm carries out
abroad (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004); it is thus an alternative measure used in the
literature.14
Another way to model FDI empirically is the gravity model (Tinbergen, 1962). Be-
cause of its simplicity and success in explanatory power,15 the gravity model is the most
widely used empirical model in the literature for explaining bilateral FDI or trade volumes
(Wei, 2000). In its basic form, the gravity model states that the amount of FDI between
two countries is directly related to the sum of their economic size, usually measured by
aggregate GDP and is inversely related to the distance between them. In addition to those
basic factors, gravity models often include other variables that either promote or deter
FDI such as dummy variables that indicate a special relationship between country pairs
such as colonial ties, a common official language, or sharing an international border. More
recently, it has also become common to control for (formal) institutional quality in gravity
model specifications.16 And although the theoretical foundation of gravity models may not
12There are two other ways in which the literature on FDI determinants addresses the problem of
conflicting predictions. The first is to accept that FDI data contains both types of FDI and that regression
analysis reports an averaged effect. The second one is to split FDI data between vertical and horizontal
FDI. The second approach might be the theoretically most sound specification. However, the separation
of FDI data is generally not possible (Baraba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
13See, for example, Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) for a literature review of other works that
have contributed to the development of the knowledge-capital model.
14The knowledge-capital model represents an analytical formalization of the OLI framework as devel-
oped by Dunning (1977), which states that a firm invests abroad if it has market power through the
ownership (O) of products or the production process; it has a location (L) advantage if producing abroad;
and lastly it has an advantage internalizing (I) its foreign activities rather than licensing or selling its
products or process to a foreign firm.
15See, for example, the meta-analysis of gravity models on goods trade by Disdier and Head (2008).
16Wheeler and Mody (1992) are an early example of studying the impact of formal institutions on FDI.
Using a composite host country risk factor that includes, among others, perception of corruption, the
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be as obvious as the one of the knowledge-capital model discussed above, it has been shown
that they are consistent with theoretical models (see Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1995).
Given its workhorse status, we use the gravity model as empirical backdrop for exam-
ining the effect immigrants have on outward FDI. Because we only use outward FDI from
the Netherlands, we do not include any variables that directly pertain to the Netherlands;
this information is constant across all countries. This gives us the following empirical
specification:17
ln Outward FDIit = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln GDP Per Capitait + β3 ln Distancei
+ β4 Governanceit + β5 ln Immigrantsit + β6 Colonyi
+ β7 Borderi + β8 Refugeesi + ηt + εit (2.1)
where Outward FDIit denotes the outward FDI stock of the Netherlands to host country i
at time t, and εit is an error term. The term ηt denotes time-fixed effects. All continuous
variables, except the governance variable are measured in natural logarithms (ln). Colony,
border and refugees are dummy variables.
Theory predicts a positive relationship between FDI and the variables GDP, governance,
migrant networks, and colony. The expected signs of the GDP per capita, distance, and
border variables are ambiguous. We include GDP per capita because, besides the overall
market size captured by aggregate GDP, the level of individual purchasing power matters.
Root and Ahmed (1979) have pointed out that total GDP may be a poor indicator of market
opportunities, especially for developing countries, as it reflects the size of the population
rather than aggregate income. Insofar GDP per capita captures market size, the theory
on horizontally motivated FDI predicts a positive coefficient sign. If GDP per capita
is employed to approximate skilled labor differences between countries (see Di Giovanni,
2005),18 however, the theory on vertically motivated FDI predicts a negative sign. The
extent of bureaucratic red tape, political stability, and the quality of the legal system but also measures of
inequality and quality of living conditions for expatriates, they fail to find a significant effect. Wei (2000)
using data on bilateral FDI stocks finds that corruption has a significant negative effect on FDI. Stein and
Daude (2002), also using bilateral FDI stocks, find that the significant negative impact of institutional
quality is not limited to corruption but rather extends to political instability and violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory burden, and the rule of law.
17Note that this specification is actually also a unilateral knowledge capital model with the additional
variables for governance quality, colonial ties between countries, and countries sharing an international
border.
18Unfortunately, data on the variable skill difference are hard to come by. Although the International
Labor Office publishes annual data on wage costs and wages, the data can be described as incomplete
at best. Data for all or most years is missing for almost every emerging market country. In absence of
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theories of horizontal and vertical FDI also give conflicting predictions for the distance and
border variables. Geographical distance increases trade costs, which encourages horizontal
FDI to avoid those costs, but simultaneously discourages vertical FDI because higher costs
of shipping goods back to the home country make production abroad less attractive. The
expected sign of the border dummy variable is unclear as it could indicate ‘likeness’ in
terms of country characteristics with the source country, suggesting a negative relationship
from the perspective of horizontally motivated FDI. Alternatively, it could also indicate
closer economic ties and familiarity that make investing relatively easier, thus suggesting a
positive relationship. Lastly, we also a include a dummy for countries sending a significant
number of refugees to the Netherlands because refugees typically come from countries with
serious violent unrest, which in turn likely prevents any FDI into these countries.
Unlike most other gravity model specifications we do not include a dummy variable for
a common language in our empirical specification. The reason is that in the context of
Dutch data the inclusion of a language dummy variable causes multicollinearity because
countries in which Dutch is an official language – Aruba, Belgium, Netherlands Antilles,
and Suriname – are either captured in the colony or border dummy.
2.2.2 Censoring
As is common in international trade and investment data, our data set contains a large
number of observations (about 40 percent) for which the outward FDI stock is zero. Given
that in trade and FDI data typically around 50 percent of the observations are censored (see
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), our censoring rate is at the lower end. Obviously, this poses
a problem; the logarithm of zero is undefined. Taking the logarithm of our dependent
variable would therefore result in dropping all zero FDI observations.
The literature deals with the censoring problem in different ways. Some authors (see
Rose, 2000) simply do drop those observations in which the dependent variable takes a
value of zero. However, zero observations do contain important information regarding the
allocation of outward FDI and excluding them biases the estimated coefficients downward.
It could be the case, for example, that zero observations are more prevalent among countries
which send few migrants to the Netherlands. Others (see Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995)
deal with the zeroes problem by adding a positive constant (i.e., a > 0 and typically a ≤ 1)
to the dependent variable—thus transforming the dependent variable from logarithm of y
any better data, GDP per capita seems to be the closest, though imperfect and not productivity-adjusted
proxy for labor costs.
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to logarithm of y + a—and continue estimating the model with OLS.19
Our dependent variable is, however, bounded from below by zero20 and our data thus
are censored. We therefore use a Tobit model. Eaton and Tamura (1994) were the first to






it if y∗it ≥ 0
0 if y∗it < 0
, (2.2)
where y is the outward FDI stock and y∗it denotes the index variable:
y∗it = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln GDP Per Capitait + β3 ln Distancei
+ β4 Governanceit + β5 ln Immigrantsit + β6 Colonyi
+ β7 Borderi + β8 Refugeesi + ηt + εit (2.3)
We will estimate the Tobit model in log-linear form using maximum likelihood (ML) esti-
mation. To capture common time effects, we include a dummy for the two different time
periods.22 For comparison, we will also report the results of our benchmark model using
two other estimation techniques; that is, OLS excluding the zero observations and OLS
with a transformed dependent variable.
2.2.3 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Issues
A potential concern regarding the estimation of our model specification is endogeneity. Ja-
vorcik et al. (2011) argue that our variable of interest, immigration, might be endogenous.
They identify two possible channels for a reverse causal relationship between immigration
19By adding a positive constant, the logarithm of the zero observations can be taken and for large y the
logarithm of y + a is approximately equal to logarithm of y. Note that this approach might be sensitive
to the choice of a.
20Technically speaking, that is not exactly true. FDI stocks can take on negative values under certain
circumstances, for example, in the case of disinvestment or continuous losses in the affiliate leading to
negative reserves. See Section 2.3 for more details on the characteristics of FDI flows in our sample.
21Eaton and Tamura’s (1994) model assumes that FDI is only strictly positive when the right-hand side
of the model reaches a minimum threshold level A, where A is to be estimated. Another way in which the
Tobit model has been employed and the zeroes retained is to simply take the logarithm of the non-zero
observations and assign zero values to the censored observations (see Stein and Daude, 2007).
22Country random effects are controlled for in the robust analysis. Panel fixed effects Tobit regressions
based on ML estimation are a problematic option when the number of cross-sectional units is large and the
panel’s time dimension is small (i.e., the incidental parameter problem). Furthermore, all time invariant
variables would drop from the panel.
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and FDI: (i) lower migration incentives because FDI may generate better employment op-
portunities in the home countries of the migrants and contribute to economic growth and
(ii) higher migration rates due to expatriate employment opportunities in the FDI source
country that facilitate migration.
While those channels are certainly plausible, it not clear that they are actually at
work. The literature on the impact of FDI on economic growth, for example, is far from
conclusive; nevertheless the positive impact assumed in the argument appears to have
acquired the status of a stylized fact (Lensink and Morrissey, 2006). Moreover, we are
also skeptical as to whether FDI from one country alone actually affects the incentives to
migrate. After all, the Netherlands is just one of many countries to invest abroad and thus
to potentially contribute to overall economic growth and employment opportunities. It also
seems to be a bit of stretch to assume that expatriate working opportunities significantly
contribute to migration, especially considering that there are likely very few expatriate
working opportunities in the first place. Therefore, we believe endogeneity is less of a
concern. Nevertheless, as a robustness check we instrument our immigrant variable.
We follow the literature in our choice of instruments and use past immigration first
instrument for current immigration. Historical networks have been shown to play an im-
portant role in current migration flows both through information exchange and family
reunification programs (Boyd, 1989). In the Netherlands family migration is the main
source of immigrants and accounts for about 40 percent of all immigrants (Focus Migra-
tion, 2007).
Another source of endogeneity in the model might be the governance variable. Because
theory suggests that migrant networks may be especially important in a weak governance
environment, we are also concerned about the potential endogeneity between governance
and FDI. Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) argue that the causality between FDI and governance
quality could run both ways. On the one hand, better formal institutions make a country
more attractive to foreign investors and thus may lead to higher FDI levels. On the other
hand, higher FDI levels could put pressure on governments to improve their institutional
framework. Again, because the Netherlands is just one of many countries to invest abroad
and thus to potentially contribute to governance improvements we do not believe this to be
an issue of concern. However, as a robustness check we also test for this endogeneity using
ethnic fractionalization as instrument. The literature on the determinants of institutional
quality suggests that ethnic fractionalization matters and is inversely related to it (see La
Porta et al., 1999).
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2.3 Data
Several data sources are used in constructing our sample. Data on the Dutch outward FDI
stock come from the Dutch Central Bank. Because annual flows of FDI are a poor proxy of
multinational activities by firms (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2003), we use stocks of outward FDI.
It is possible, for example, that FDI flows to a recipient country in a given year are zero
even though Dutch firms might have a significant presence and activity in this country.
Furthermore, flows may substantially change from year to year, owing to valuation changes.
Data on migrants come from Statistics Netherlands. It defines immigrants as people
living in the Netherlands who have at least one non-Dutch parent and bases its data on the
registered population of the Netherlands.23 Following Javorcik et al. (2011) and Kugler
and Rapoport (2007), we approximate migrant networks by the total number of immi-
grants.24 Statistics Netherlands also provides a generational breakdown of immigrations
by country, distinguishing between first and second generation immigrants. It classifies
as first generation those immigrants who are born abroad and as second generation those
born in the Netherlands. Within the category of second generation immigrants further
distinction is made between those with one parent born abroad and those with both par-
ents born abroad. In addition to the total number of immigrants we also use the total
number immigrants by generation and both the total number of immigrants and the share
of immigrants by generation in alternate specifications. In our instrumental variable esti-
mation we use data on immigrants in 1996, the first year for which a country-by-country
breakdown is available, as instrument for the cross-sectional sample.
The data set covers 180 recipient countries for the 1997–2006 period. The year 1996
is the first for which a country-by-country breakdown of immigrants in the Netherlands is
23Note that different countries employ different definitions of immigrants. In the United States, for
example, only foreign-born individuals are classified as immigrants.
24Ideally, we would like to not only measure the existence and size of the network but rather its
strength, that is, the extent of contact that specific immigrant groups have with their country of origin
and the level of entrepreneurial activity associated with it. Unfortunately, the data requirements for this
kind of measure are prohibitively high. In the context of ethnic Chinese networks and bilateral trade
data, the ethnic network has been proxied by the probability that if an individual is randomly chosen
from each country, both are Chinese (i.e., the product of the ethnic Chinese population shares for each
country pair; see Rauch and Trindade, 2002) or the number of potential international connections between
the ethnic Chinese populations in the two countries (i.e., the product of the two respective populations;
Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Tong, 2005). Gao (2003), using unilateral data, approximates the size of the
ethnic Chinese network by the population share of the Chinese in the source country of FDI into China.
Because we do not have bilateral data but only one FDI source country and because by definition of our
more general immigrant network everyone in the FDI host country belongs to the network, our focus on
the number of migrants in the Netherlands captures the size of the migrant networks closely.
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available and 2006 is the most recent year for which FDI data are available. Our benchmark
sample is a panel in which we divide the sample into two waves of equal length, 1997–2001
and 2002–2006, and use the averages of those two periods as dependent variables. We
average the data instead of using the full panel for reasons similar to why we choose FDI
stocks over FDI flows, namely to mitigate any volatility in the FDI data from year to year.
Even though we believe that the variance in our sample lies in the cross-section of our
data because most of our exogenous variables are relatively time-invariant and we look at
FDI stocks, we use the panel to exploit the additional information available in our data
that would be lost if we only focused on the cross-section. Table 2.1 provides summary
statistics.
The two wave panel approach is also of value because we are concerned about multi-
collinearity in the data which may lead to unreliable estimates with high standard errors.
A look at the correlation matrix for the Tobit sample in Table 2.2 indeed shows high cor-
relations for a number of explanatory variables: GDP is highly correlated with immigrants
and GDP per capita is highly correlated with governance. Furthermore, GDP shows a
strong association with FDI. A remedy to the problem of multicollinearity, which is es-
sentially one of insufficient information in the sample, is to extend the sample. Using the
panel approach, we are able to double the sample to 360 observation compared to 180
observations in the cross-section. As a robustness check, we also report the results for a
cross-section using the averages over the 2002-2006 period only.
Table 2.3 lists the Top 20 countries of origin for immigrants in the Netherlands and the
Top 20 host countries of the Dutch FDI stock for the period 2002–2006. Immigrants con-
stitute about 18 percent of the total population in the Netherlands and about 80 percent of
them come from just 20 countries, including four countries which are former Dutch colonies
(Indonesia, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba) and two countries which we clas-
sify as refugee countries (Iraq and Afghanistan). Table 2.3 also lists the Top 20 destination
countries for the outward FDI stock of the Netherlands. Almost 90 percent of the outward
FDI stock is concentrated in 20 countries. Nine countries appear in both the immigrant
column and the outward FDI stock column, suggesting that FDI and immigration may
indeed be complements.
Data on real GDP and real GDP per capita come from the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI). Data on physical distance, land borders, and colonies are
taken from Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et D’Informations Internationales (CEPII). Gov-
ernance data come from Kaufman et al. (2008) and the governance variable is constructed
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by taking the average of six individual governance indicators (i.e., voice and accountability,
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption). Indicators range from −2.5 to 2.5 with more positive values indicating bet-
ter governance. We identify a country as a refugee country if for any given year during
the sample period the country sends at least 200 refugees to the Netherlands as recorded
by the UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. Data on fractionalization come
from Alesina et al. (2003). Fractionalization measures ethnic heterogeneity and varies
between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating more fractionalized or ethnically heteroge-
neous countries. See Table 2.A in the Appendix for detailed variable definitions and data
sources.
2.4 Empirical Results
We begin our analysis with the presentation of our benchmark panel result. Next, we
repeat our analysis for the cross-section sample before reporting the results from the in-
strumental variable approach. We then present the results by generational composition of
the immigrant stock. Finally, we test whether the results of our benchmark Tobit panel
results are robust to changes in sample and whether immigrant networks promote outward
FDI to a greater extent into countries with relative weaker institutions.
2.4.1 Benchmark Panel Results
Our benchmark panel results are reported in Table 2.4. We start with reporting the OLS
estimates of our specification in columns (1)–(4) for both dropped and retained zeroes
before turning to the Tobit estimates, our preferred estimates, in columns (5)–(6). For
each estimation we report first the standard gravity model and then add the immigrant
variable.
Our results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between the
number of immigrants and the Dutch FDI stock in their country of origin in the specification
that do not drop the zero observations (columns (4) and (6)). In the OLS specification
with retained zeroes the coefficient estimate of the immigrant variable is 0.64 suggesting
a 1 percent increase in the stock of immigrants leads to a 0.64 percent increase in FDI. In
the Tobit model the estimated coefficient suggests that a 1 percent increase in the stock
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of immigrants leads to a 1.08 percent increase in FDI.25 26 The size of our estimates is
comparable to the findings of Javorcik et al. (2011) who, depending on their specification,
find that a 1 percent increase in the immigrant stock is associated with a 0.35-0.67 percent
increase in the FDI stock using an OLS specification.
The OLS results suggest that both models explain between 60–70 percent of the total
variance in FDI, which is in line with other OLS estimates of gravity models for FDI in the
literature. The standard variables GDP, distance, governance, colony, and border are sig-
nificant in the specification with dropped zeroes. The distance variable and border dummy
variable are no longer significant once the zero observations are included. Governance loses
its significance in the Tobit specifications.
2.4.2 Cross-Section Results
We noted above that we believe that the variation of the sample comes from the cross-
section of the sample. Table 2.5 therefore repeats the analysis in Table 2.4 for just the
cross-section of the 2002–2006 average. The results are almost identical to the panel
results reported in Table 2.4 with slight changes in the coefficient point estimates. The
estimates also confirm our suspicion regarding multicollinearity in the data. Compared
to the panel regressions the standard errors increase and as result the significance of the
immigrant variables decreases from the 5 percent level of significance to the 10 percent
level of significance.
25Note that the estimated coefficients in a Tobit model have a different interpretation than in an OLS
model. The coefficients represent an upper bound on the marginal effect because the natural logarithm
of the expected value of yi given a change in xi (i.e., the vector of explanatory variables) depends on the









where 0 < Φ (·) < 1 denotes the probability and β is a vector of coefficients. This equation says that
with censoring at zero, as in our case, the coefficient estimate is multiplied by the probability of having a
positive outcome. If the probability of having a positive outcome is one for a particular country, then the
marginal effect is simply β. The marginal effects we calculated (but do not report here) are as expected a
bit smaller than the coefficient estimates reported but have the same relative ordering.
26Because Tobit ML estimates generally do not remain consistent in the presence of non-normality and
heteroskedasticity of the errors, we check whether the errors are indeed normal and homoskedastic. The
conditional moment test of Pagan and Vella (1989) against the null hypothesis of normal errors has a
p-value of 0.1330 and 0.0608, respectively, for the model excluding and including the immigrant variable.
Thus, we cannot reject the normality of the errors at the 10 percent and 5 percent significance level or
higher, respectively. We report robust standard errors.
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2.4.3 Instrumental Variable Results
We address the potential endogeneity of the immigration and governance variables by us-
ing the instrumental variable approach for the Tobit model. Because the earliest data on
migration broken down by nationality is only available in 1996 we use our cross-section
sample as basis for the instrumental variable approach. There are two ways to estimate
Tobit models with instrumented variables. The two-step estimator based on Newey’s min-
imum χ2 estimator estimates the first stage as an OLS regression with all the explanatory
variables in the original model plus the instrument on the variable to be instrumented.
The ML estimator, on the other hand, simultaneously estimates the first and the second
stage. The results for both estimators are reported in Table 2.6 because while the ML
estimator is more efficient, unlike the two-step estimator, it does not allow for the Wald
exogeneity test.
We start by instrumenting the immigrant variable. The results from the first stage
(in the interest of space restricted to the coefficient estimates of the instruments) suggest
that the number of immigrants in 1996 is a good instrument for the average number of
immigrants during the 2002-2006 period. We find a significant and positive relationship
between the immigrant variable and the FDI stock. Compared to the regular cross-section
Tobit results, the IV results are larger in magnitude. This suggests that the Tobit results
may be biased downwards. However, we remain skeptical as to whether endogeneity is
indeed a concern. Combined with the fact that the data unfortunately only allows us to
lag immigration by six years, the panel regression results reported above thus remain our
preferred specification.
We also instrument the governance variable with the fractionalization variable. The
results are reported in the last two columns of Table 2.5. Our first-stage regressions indicate
that ethnic fractionalization is insignificant and therefore not a valid instrument for our
sample (second stage results are therefore not reported). To test the null hypothesis of
exogenous governance, we conduct a Wald exogeneity test. The p-values indicate that the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10 percent significance level. This suggest that
no endogeneity exists and therefore no IV estimation is necessary, confirming our doubts
concerning the endogeneity of the governance variable.
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2.4.4 Generational Composition of Immigrants
Our dataset allows us to identify the generational composition of immigrants by country.
We use this information to test whether the relationship between migrants and FDI varies
by generational background. In particular, using our preferred Tobit panel specification we
replace the number of immigrants first by the number of immigrants for each generation
(Table 2.7) and then use both the total number of immigrants and the share of a given
immigrant generation (Table 2.8).27 Since the literature predicts that migrant networks
can help overcome information barriers between two countries and may so promote FDI
we expect that the effect is strongest for second generation immigrants and in particular
those with one parent born abroad since they are most likely to have a strong cultural
bond to both their country of origin and the Netherlands.
The results suggests that the presence of immigrants of all backgrounds is positively
and significantly related to the Dutch FDI stock in their country of origin. The coeffi-
cient estimate is larger and more statistically significant for second generation immigrants
compared to first generation immigrants. The results suggest that a 1 percent increase
in all second generation immigrants results in a 1.27 percent increase in the Dutch FDI
stock in their country of origin.28 This compares to the coefficient estimates of 1.08 for all
immigrants in Table 2.4. Within the group of second generation immigrants the coefficient
estimates is larger and more statistically significant for those with one parent born abroad
(1.68) compared to those with both parents born abroad (0.78). These results are in line
with the predictions from the literature. Second generation immigrants and particularly
those with one parent born abroad constitute the group of immigrants that is most likely
to have a strong connection to both their home country and the Netherlands through their
parents and is thus most likely to be able to facilitate the promotion of FDI.
The results are similar if instead of the number of immigrants by generation we use the
total number of immigrants and control additionally for the share of a given generation as
percentage of total migration. Again, the effect is largest and most statistically significant
for second generation immigrants and in particular those with one parent born abroad.
Holding the total number of immigrants constant, a 1 percent increase in the share of
second generation immigrants (second generation immigrants with one parent born abroad)
raises the Dutch FDI stock in their country of origin by an additional 0.14 (0.11) percent.
27The results are similar for the other model specifications reported in Table 2.4
28Again note that those coefficient estimates are upper bounds on the effect (see footnote 25 above).
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2.4.5 Sample Robustness Tests
In Table 2.9 we test whether our key result of the panel Tobit analysis is robust to changes
in our sample. In the first column, we restrict our sample to only those 33 countries that
receive 95 percent of the Dutch FDI outward stock as we are most interested in knowing
whether our key result holds once we exclude all those countries that do not receive a
significant portion of Dutch FDI. We label this sample Major FDI Recipients. In column
(2), we restrict our sample to Non-Small Countries, that is we drop those countries from
our sample that have populations of fewer than one million inhabitants as they might not
be relevant recipient countries. The third column restricts the sample to non-EU countries.
Member countries of the EU have a special relationship with the Netherlands due to the
EU single market which ensures the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons
and thus may affect both migration and FDI flows.
Our finding that immigrants significantly affect outward FDI is robust to all three
changes in sample.29 However, the coefficient estimate for the Major FDI Recipients sample
is only a fraction ot the Non-small Countries and Non-EU Countries sample: while a
1 percent increase in the number of immigrants increases the FDI stock by only 0.17
percent for major FDI recipients, a 1 percent increase in immigrants in the Non-small
Countries sample increases the FDI stock by 1.44 percent or by 1.31 percent in the Non-
EU Countries sample.30 Given that the countries in the Major FDI Recipients sample are
almost exclusively countries with relatively good formal institutions, finding that migrant
networks have less of an effect in that sample is in line with our expectations.
In the remaining columns of Table 2.9 we test whether immigrant networks do indeed
promote outward FDI to a greater extent into countries with relatively weak institutions
as theory suggests. To do so, we use two approaches. First, we add an interaction effect
between immigrants and governance. The interaction effect enters negatively and signifi-
cantly at the 1 percent level suggesting that immigrants have a larger effect on the outward
FDI stock the lower the quality of governance.
Second, we divide countries into three categories of governance quality: high, average,
and low. Given that our governance variable varies from −2.5 to 2.5 and the mean value
29The results are also robust to excluding the Russian Federation and the United States, two major
countries that both fall into the Top 20 immigrant source and outward FDI stock host countries for the
Netherlands (see Table 2.3), in addition to EU member countries from the sample.
30Again note that those coefficient estimates are upper bounds on the effect (see footnote 25 above).
Note also that the sub-samples differ in their percentage of censored observations, which affects the calcu-
lation of the marginal effects.
24 The Role of Institutions in International Finance
for that variable in our sample is about zero, we put a country into the high governance
category if its governance value is greater than 0.5, the low governance category if smaller
than −0.5, and the average governance category if otherwise. Since the standard deviation
of the governance variable is about 0.9 in our sample about a third of the sample falls
into each of the three governance categories. Our results show that the coefficient of the
immigrant variable is decreasing as we move from low to high governance. However, the
coefficient estimates are only significant in the average and high governance samples. A 1
percent increase in the number of immigrants increases FDI by 1.46 percent in countries
with average governance quality while it only increases FDI by 0.94 percent in countries
with high governance.31
The results of both approaches suggest that immigrant networks indeed play a more
important role in promoting FDI if the institutional quality in the destination country
is relatively weak. The insignificance of the immigrant variable in the low governance
sample is a bit puzzling. Theory suggests that migrant networks might be especially
important in promoting international trade and investment in environments with weak
formal governance structure. A possible explanation for this finding is that there might be
a threshold effect at work: only when investment takes place in an environment where a
minimum standard of governance is met, do immigrant networks make a difference.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the effect of immigrant networks on FDI. It extends the evidence that
co-ethnic social networks promote international investment to more general ethnic net-
works, namely migrant networks. Using a gravity model and panel data on 180 countries,
we find that immigrants and FDI flows are complements in the context of Dutch data. In
our preferred Tobit specification, a 1 percent increase in the number of immigrants in the
Netherlands increases the Dutch FDI stock in their country of origin by 1.08 percent. The
effect is strongest for second generation immigrants with one parent born abroad. A 1 per-
cent increase in the number of second generation immigrants with one parent born abroad
increases the Dutch FDI stock by 1.68 percent. Furthermore, keeping the total number
of immigrants constant, a 1 percent increase in the share of second generation immigrants
with one parent born abroad raises the Dutch FDI stock by an additional 0.1 percent. The
31Again note that those coefficient estimates are upper bounds on the effect (see footnote 25 above).
Note also that the sub-samples differ in their percentage of censored observations, which affects the calcu-
lation of the marginal effects.
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sign and significance of the immigrant variable is robust to a range of robustness checks
though the size of the coefficient does vary. Our robustness checks also suggest that coun-
tries may have to reach a certain threshold level of governance quality for immigrants to
play a significant role in promoting FDI.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
# obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tobit Panel Sample (including zeroes)
FDI (ln) 360 11.501 9.828 0.000 25.043
Immigrants (ln) 360 7.073 2.509 0.000 12.916
All 1st Generation Immigrants (ln) 358 6.644 2.452 0.000 12.167
All 2nd Generation Immigrants (ln) 358 5.895 2.608 0.000 12.595
2nd Generation: One Parent Born Abroad (ln) 358 5.394 2.514 0.000 12.518
2nd Generation: Two Parents Born Abroad (ln) 358 4.590 2.695 0.000 11.826
Share of 1st Generation Immigrants 356 66.137 14.247 0.000 97.779
Share of 2nd Generation Immigrants 356 33.863 14.247 2.221 100.000
Share of 2nd Generation: One Parent Born Abroad Immigrants 356 24.276 16.223 0.379 100.000
Share of 2nd Generation: Two Parents Born Abroad Immigrants 356 9.587 7.505 0.000 41.052
GDP (ln) 360 23.103 2.399 17.657 29.996
GDP per capita (ln) 360 7.654 1.647 4.458 11.530
Distance (ln) 360 8.417 0.894 5.153 9.845
Governance 360 -0.014 0.904 -2.122 1.925
Colony Dummy 360 0.033 0.180 0.000 1.000
Border Dummy 360 0.011 0.105 0.000 1.000
Refugee Dummy 360 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000
OLS Panel Sample (excluding zeroes)
FDI (ln) 211 19.622 2.240 14.509 25.043
Immigrants (ln) 211 8.165 2.059 1.825 12.916
GDP (ln) 211 24.465 1.931 19.915 29.996
GDP per capita (ln) 211 8.285 1.545 4.458 11.530
Distance (ln) 211 8.249 1.019 5.153 9.845
Governance 211 0.278 0.913 -2.064 1.925
Colony Dummy 211 0.057 0.232 0.000 1.000
Border Dummy 211 0.019 0.137 0.000 1.000
Refugee Dummy 211 0.038 0.191 0.000 1.000
Tobit Cross-Section Sample (including zeroes)
FDI (ln) 180 11.762 9.903 0.000 25.043
Immigrants (ln) 180 7.257 2.485 0.000 12.891
GDP (ln) 180 23.199 2.401 17.715 29.996
GDP per capita (ln) 180 7.717 1.649 4.458 11.530
Distance (ln) 180 8.417 0.896 5.153 9.845
Governance 180 -0.013 0.909 -1.808 1.925
Colony Dummy 180 0.033 0.180 0.000 1.000
Border Dummy 180 0.011 0.105 0.000 1.000
Refugee Dummy 180 0.061 0.240 0.000 1.000
Instrumental Variables
Immigrants in 1996 (ln) 180 6.635 2.565 0.000 12.928
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Table 2.3: Top 20 Immigrant Source and Outward FDI Stock Host Countries for the
Netherlands, 2002 to 2006 Average
Immigrants Outward FDI Stock
Number Cumulative % in 2002 constant Cumulative %
US$ (Millions)
Indonesia* 396,811 13.02 United States 75,200 16.56
Germany 388,530 25.78 United Kingdom 65,450 30.97
Turkey 352,589 37.35 Germany 39,390 39.65
Suriname* 325,990 48.05 Belgium 39,040 48.25
Morocco 309,038 58.19 Switzerland 32,780 55.47
Belgium 112,805 61.90 France 30,410 62.16
Netherlands Antilles* 84,108 64.66 Luxembourg* 20,530 66.68
United Kingdom 75,909 67.15 Spain 19,010 70.87
Aruba* 45,074 68.63 Italy 13,190 73.78
Iraq** 42,928 70.04 Ireland 11,740 76.36
China 41,682 71.41 Canada 9,259 78.40
Poland 39,727 72.71 Brazil 6,687 79.87
Italy 35,827 73.89 Poland 6,102 81.22
Afghanistan** 35,493 75.05 Sweden 5,987 82.54
France 32,907 76.13 Russian Federation 5,411 83.73
Spain 31,183 77.15 Australia 5,256 84.88
United States 30,246 78.15 Singapore 5,121 86.01
Serbia and Montenegro 29,884 79.13 Nigeria 4,151 86.93
Iran 28,275 80.06 Austria 3,861 87.78
Russian Federation 21,228 80.75 Korea, Rep. 3,846 88.62
Total 3,046,599 100.00 Total 454,077 100
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Statistics Netherlands, Dutch Central Bank,
and the World Development Indicators.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: Estimation Results for the IV Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Two-Step ML Two-Step ML
Stage I





Immigrants (ln) 1.206** 1.206**
(0.564) (0.564)
GDP (ln) 3.089*** 3.089***
(0.617) (0.616)
GDP per capita (ln) 1.425 1.425
(1.010) (1.009)




Colony Dummy 4.640 4.640
(4.529) (4.525)
Border Dummy -6.142 -6.142
(6.875) (6.867)





Number of observations 180 180 180 180
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average stock
of FDI for 2002–2006, where the zero observations are taken into account as
censored observations. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively.
Columns (1)-(2) instrument the immigrant variable while column (3)-(4) in-
struments the governance variable. Because the instrument for governance is
invalid no second stage results are reported.
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Table 2.7: Estimation Results for Tobit Panel: Immigrants by Generation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 1st Generation Immigrants (ln) 0.891*
(0.515)
All 2nd Generation Immigrants (ln) 1.265***
(0.469)
2nd Generation: One Parent Born Abroad (ln) 1.681***
(0.528)
2nd Generation: Two Parents Born Abroad (ln) 0.775**
(0.387)
GDP (ln) 3.461*** 3.080*** 2.760*** 3.536***
(0.567) (0.545) (0.558) (0.500)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.620 0.941 1.167 0.574
(1.018) (1.002) (0.992) (1.007)
Distance (ln) 0.372 0.535 0.712 0.361
(0.759) (0.763) (0.789) (0.736)
Governance 1.659 1.268 0.873 1.743
(1.689) (1.683) (1.682) (1.681)
Colony Dummy 6.852** 4.498 2.648 6.752**
(3.201) (3.131) (3.320) (3.029)
Border Dummy -5.277 -7.302* -8.747** -5.419
(3.715) (3.801) (3.882) (3.757)
Refugee Dummy -5.375 -5.317 -4.864 -5.213
(3.845) (3.722) (3.580) (3.782)
Dummy for 1997-2002 Period 0.364 0.544 0.597 0.460
(0.456) (0.457) (0.445) (0.472)
Constant -85.585*** -82.136*** -79.555*** -84.547***
(12.861) (12.661) (12.679) (12.792)
Log-Likelihood -859.41 -855.87 -852.72 -858.82
p-value LR test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 358 358 358 358
% censored observations 41.06 41.06 41.06 41.06
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average stock of FDI (for 1997–2001
and 2002–2006), where the zero observations are taken into account as censored observations. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level,
respectively.
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Table 2.8: Estimation Results for Tobit Panel: Immigrants by Genera-
tional Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Immigrants (ln) 0.881* 0.881* 1.235** 0.856
(0.512) (0.512) (0.537) (0.652)
Share of 1st Generation Immigrants -0.140**
(0.058)
Share of 2nd Generation Immigrants 0.140**
(0.058)
Share of 2nd Generation: 0.108**
One Parent Born Abroad Immigrants (0.050)
Share of 2nd Generation: 0.033
Both Parents Born Abroad Immigrants (0.100)
GDP (ln) 3.254*** 3.254*** 3.066*** 3.390***
(0.555) (0.555) (0.565) (0.615)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.918 0.918 0.981 0.762
(0.993) (0.993) (0.998) (1.025)
Distance (ln) 0.180 0.180 0.349 0.293
(0.761) (0.761) (0.779) (0.770)
Governance 0.624 0.624 0.639 1.504
(1.710) (1.710) (1.734) (1.724)
Colony Dummy 4.803 4.803 4.357 6.448*
(3.436) (3.436) (3.448) (3.316)
Border Dummy -10.178** -10.178** -10.271** -5.786
(4.001) (4.001) (4.189) (3.862)
Refugee Dummy -4.162 -4.162 -4.860 -5.295
(3.759) (3.759) (3.758) (3.870)
Dummy for 1997-2002 Period 0.520 0.520 0.444 0.418
(0.457) (0.457) (0.453) (0.460)
Constant -72.433*** -86.467*** -84.310*** -84.777***
(12.612) (12.374) (12.417) (12.867)
Log-Likelihood -852.97 -852.97 -854.32 -857.66
p-value LR test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 356 356 356 356
% censored observations 40.73 40.73 40.73 40.73
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average stock of FDI (for 1997–
2001 and 2002–2006), where the zero observations are taken into account as censored observa-
tions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the
1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.A: Variable Definitions
Sample The benchmark sample consists of the 185 member states of the IMF plus
eight countries for which the Dutch Central Bank reports outward FDI stocks
in the 1997–2006 period and immigration data are available (Andorra, Aruba,
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Liechtenstein, Netherlands Antilles,
Taiwan). Note that Serbia and Montenegro were one country until June 3,
2006 and are thus treated as such. Timor-Leste was only founded in 2002 and
is thus not part of the sample. Subsequently, Andorra, Myanmar, and Somalia
are dropped because of lack of GDP data; Cayman Islands and the Maldives
are left out because of the lack of fractionalization data; and Bermuda, Re-
public of Congo, Colombia, Gabon, and Peru are dropped because of negative
FDI stocks. Negative FDI stocks do not have an interpretation in the con-
text of the migration variable. With dropping the Netherlands, this brings
the total number of observations in the cross section to 180. The benchmark
sample is a pooled panel of two waves of equal length, 1997-2001 and 2002-
2006, with 1996 being the first year for which immigration data disaggregated
by country are available and 2006 is the latest year for which outward FDI
stock data are available.
Variable Description Source
FDI The definition of FDI is according to IMF Balance of Payments Manual
(1993). FDI distinguishes itself from other form of international investments
in that it reflects the objective of an investor to obtain a lasting interest in an
enterprise abroad. This lasting interest expresses itself in having significant
control over the operations of an enterprise, which in turn is defined as holding
at least 10 percent of the ordinary shares (or equivalent) in the foreign enter-
prise. Because measures of FDI based on balance of payments data do not
take into account changes in FDI due to retained savings, valuation changes,
and re-pricing the Dutch Central Bank collects data on the FDI stock through
surveys. Until 2002, it surveyed 1,500 firms for the Dutch outward FDI stock
on an annual basis. Since 2003, it has switched to monthly surveys of 1,000
firms (Van Wersch, 2003). The FDI stock (measured in Euros) is converted
into 2000 constant US$ using the official EUR/US$ exchange rate and sub-




Real GDP In 2000 constant US$. Data for Afghanistan, Qatar, and Sao Tome and
Principe are taken from IMF Country Reports and data for Liechtenstein,
the Netherlands Antilles, and Taiwan come from local government sources
and subsequently are converted into 2000 constant US$.
WDI
Real GDP per capita In 2000 constant US$. Data for Afghanistan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands
Antilles, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, and Taiwan are calculated using
population data available from the WDI, UN, and local government sources.
WDI
Distance Great circle distance (in kilometers) between capital cities and Amsterdam.
The distance for Liechtenstein is calculated by the authors.
CEPII
Governance Institutional quality is measured by the average of the following six gover-
nance indicators: voice and accountability; political stability; government
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. The
indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5 (with more positive values reflecting better
institutional quality) and are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002–2007.
Values for the unobserved years 1997, 1999, and 2001 are interpolated by
taking the average of the previous and subsequent year. For nine countries
(Aruba, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Netherlands Antilles, Palau,
San Marino, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tonga) data for at least one of the six
governance indicators are missing. The values for those countries are calcu-
lated by using the governance indicator value for the nearest year available.
Kaufmann et
al. (2008)
Continued on next page
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Immigrants People living in the Netherlands who have at least one non-Dutch parent
are referred to as immigrants. Immigration data are based on the registered
population of the Netherlands. In principle, everyone who lawfully lives in
the Netherlands (at an address reported to the municipal government) for an
unlimited amount of time is registered. Immigrants are classified as first gen-
eration immigrants if born abroad with at least one parent born abroad and as
second generation immigrants if born in the Netherlands with at least one par-
ent born abroad. Within the group of second generation immigrants further
distinction is made between those with one parent born abroad and those with
both parents born abroad. Data for Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles are
reported jointly and are separated subsequently by allocating their 2006 pop-
ulation share of the joint population to Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles,
respectively. The same procedure is applied to the countries that made up the
former Czechoslovakia (now Czech Republic and Slovakia); former Yugoslavia
(now Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and
Slovenia); and former Soviet Union (now Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Es-
tonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan); as




Colony Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country ever had a colonial
link to the Netherlands. Data for Liechtenstein is added by the authors.
CEPII
Border Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country shares a land border
with the Netherlands. The data point for Liechtenstein are added by the
authors.
CEPII
Refugee Countries Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the Netherlands received more
than 200 people who are classified as refugees and people in refugee-like sit-





Fractionalization The variable measures ethnic fractionalization, which involves a combination
of racial and linguistic characteristics. (Ethnicity data for Latin American
and Caribbean countries are often based on race (see Bolivia) while for some
European countries it largely represents language (see Switzerland)). The
measure varies between 0 and 1 and is calculated by 1 minus the sum of the
squares of sij where sij is the share of group i in country j. Data on ethnic
fractionalization are not available for Aruba, Netherlands Antilles, Sao Tome
and Principe, and Yemen. The higher values of either linguistic or religious
fractionalization are substituted instead.
Alesina et al.
(2003)
Major FDI Recipients Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country belongs to the group
of countries which, by descending largest FDI share, receive a cumulative 95





Small Countries Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country has a population of
less than one million.
WDI
Governance Quality Dummy variable that takes the value ‘high,’ ‘average’ or ‘low.’ The gover-
nance quality of a country is classified as high if its governance value is larger
than 0.5, low if the governance value is smaller than -0.5 and average if oth-
erwise. This classification is based on the observation that the mean of the
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3.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis that started in mid-2007 brought an abrupt halt to international
capital flows after years of rapidly rising financial globalization. International capital flows
fell across all categories with cross-border bank lending exhibiting the largest fall. Figure 1
and Figure 2 illustrate the development of quarterly international bank lending flows from
1977 to 2009 both in constant U.S. dollars and in percent of world GDP. Until the late
1990s, quarterly cross-border banking flows remained below 5 percent of world GDP. In the
subsequent decade quarterly flows steadily increased and tripled to around 15 percent of
world GDP in the first quarter of 2007. From there, flows sharply fell to minus 12 percent
of world GDP in the fourth quarter of 2008.2
Yet despite this increase in globalization of international capital flows in the years
before the financial crisis of 2008, many developing countries still have limited access to
international capital markets to finance domestic investment.3 This development is in
contrast to neoclassical theory that predicts that capital should flow from rich to poor
countries, where marginal returns are higher. The phenomenon of the lack of capital flows
from rich to poor countries has been coined the ‘Lucas Paradox’ after Lucas (1990) who first
pointed out this discrepancy between theory and empirical observation. Lucas’ work has
spawned a host of explanations, including by Lucas himself, which can be grouped into two
main categories. The first group is comprised of explanations that affect the fundamental
underlying production structure of an economy such as differences in technology, missing
factors of production or lack of complementarity to capital factors (Caselli and Feyrer,
2007). The second group is centered around explanations of international capital market
imperfections including moral hazard (Gertler and Rogoff, 1990), a history of serial default
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), and informational frictions (Portes and Rey, 2005).
Alfaro et al. (2008) empirically examine the role of the different explanations put
forward and conclude that during the period 1970 to 2000 institutional quality is the lead-
ing causal explanation for the lack of international capital flows to developing countries.
2This compares to annual global capital flows across all categories from below 5 percent of world GDP
over the same period to over 20 percent in 2007 and a subsequent fall to less than 5 percent in 2008. This
fall in international capital flows has been much sharper than for trade flows which, by comparison, fell by
only 25 percent between the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille,
2011).
3See for example Bosworth and Collins (1999) and Prasad et al. (2007). It is worth noting that some
countries have been quite successful in attracting international capital flows in recent years to the degree
that international banks have come to play a at times even dominant role in the financial structure of some
developing countries (World Bank, 2008).
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Papaioannou (2009) provides further evidence for this finding in the specific context of in-
ternational bank lending flows using data over the period 1984 to 2002. Their explanation is
that institutional quality as measuring the political, legal, and bureaucratic circumstances
is complementary to capital and thus increases its returns. As such, access to international
capital flows might be one of the mechanisms through which institutions affect long-run
economic development (Acemoglu, 2005). However, their period of analysis ends in 2000
and 2002, respectively, just as international capital flows, and international bank flows in
particular, take off.
This chapter combines data on international bank lending and the quality of institutions
to study the role of institutions in attracting cross-border capital flows before and after the
financial crisis. In particular, does the positive relationship between institutional quality
and international capital flows hold during the rapid expansion of financial globalization?
On the one hand, banks might continue to allocate their lending according to the same
criteria as before. On the other hand, with rapidly increasing international lending volumes
banks might become less discriminate during boom periods and institutions might matter
less. Similarly, it is not obvious what happens in a period of massive retrenchment of
capital flows such as during the recent crisis. On the one hand, countries with a better
institutional environment might be relatively more insulated against declines in capital
flows as lenders lend relatively less to countries with poorer institutional quality. On the
other hand, cross-border lending might fall across the board and irrespective of institutional
quality as banks reduce their international lending.
Combining bilateral data on quarterly international bank flows to up to 136 countries
from 1984 to 2009 with measures of institutional quality I find that there appears to be an
asymmetric relationship between institutional quality and cross-border bank flows during
periods of boom and bust. Better institutions promote cross-border bank lending in the
years leading up to the financial crisis, including during the period of rapidly rising flows
from 2003 to 2007. At the same time, the results also indicate that this relationship breaks
down during and in the immediate wake of the financial crisis. The positive relationship
disappears for the overall sample, and, driven by flows to high-income, high institutional
quality OECD countries, indeed even turns negative. However, when restricting the sample
to emerging markets vis-à-vis countries, countries with higher institutional quality appear
to still hold a small advantage in attracting cross-border capital flows.
The chapter speaks to several literatures. First, it contributes to the literature on the
Lucas Paradox as discussed above by documenting the relationship between institutional
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quality and international capital flows. As such it is also closely related to empirical work
that examines how institutional quality and informational frictions affect different types of
international capital flows (see for example Wei, 2000a and 2000b; Portes et al., 2001; Wei
and Wu, 2002; Buch, 2003; Portes and Rey, 2005; and Gelos and Wei, 2005) in addition
to the already mentioned work specifically on institutional quality and international bank
lending by Alfaro et al. (2008) and Papaioannou (2009). Employing for the most part cross-
sectional approaches those papers document a significant relationship between different
measures of institutional quality such as corruption, bureaucracy, transparency, and overall
institutional quality. With the exception of Gelos and Wei (2005), who examine the role of
transparency in equity investment fund flows to emerging markets from 1996 and 2000 and
consider the effect of the Asian and Russian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the asymmetry of
the role of institutions has so far not been considered in this literature. The chapter thus
contributes to this literature by providing evidence that while institutions can explain the
lack of bank lending flows to developing countries during periods of increasing international
capital flows this relationship generally breaks down during dramatic falls in cross-border
bank lending such as during the 2008 global financial crisis.
Second, the chapter provides empirical evidence to the theoretical models that show
that capital market imperfections in the form of lack of institutional quality can deter
or even reverse the direction of international capital flows contrary to predictions of the
frictionless neoclassical model.4 The most closely related theoretical model comes from
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) who show that better investor protection generates higher
returns for investors, both domestic and foreign, and that investors are thus unlikely to
invest in countries with weak investor protection. In particular, they build a model in which
entrepreneurs set up firms and seek external finance from investors and where investor
protection varies by country. Entrepreneurs maximize their personal wealth which, among
other things, is a function of the amount of revenue they are able to divert from the firm.
Because better investor protection makes diversion more costly to entrepreneurs, expected
diversion is lower in countries with better institutions. Anticipating the likelihood of
diversion, investors are thus reluctant to invest in countries with low levels of investor
protection.
Third, this chapter speaks to a large law and finance literature (see La Porta et al.,
1998 and 2008 for an overview) that links legal and regulatory frameworks to access and
availability of financial products and in turn economic growth.
4See Ju and Wei (2010) for an overview.
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Finally, the chapter also contributes to the literature on the global financial crisis and
its effects on international capital flows. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) provide a detailed
overview of the impact and the timing of the crisis on different types of international capital
flows. Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) study the spillover effects of economic boom and bust
in developed countries to a select group of emerging markets countries via international
bank lending using data until 2008. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009), Bank for International
Settlements (2009a, 2009b and 2009c) and Hoggarth et al. (2010) consider the transmission
effects of the international financial crisis through international bank lending. None of the
papers though consider the role of institutions in international bank lending flows during
the crisis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data
sources used to construct the dataset. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology.
Section 4 discusses the results and additional robustness checks are examined in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Data
The sample is constructed from two main sources. The first is a dataset on bilateral
international bank flows. The second set contains measures of time-variant institutional
quality. I explain each of the two datasets in turn as well as discuss the sources of additional
variables.
3.2.1 International Bank Flows
The data on bilateral quarterly international bank flows comes from the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements’ (BIS) Locational Banking Statistics.5 Data published in this statistics
5The BIS publishes data on international bank flows under two complementary concepts, locational
and consolidated. Under the locational concept, assets and liabilities are reported based on the residence
principle. The reporting banks include both banks headquartered in the country and affiliates of foreign
banks. Under the consolidated concept, assets and liabilities are reported based on the international
exposure of banks, including cross-border lending through foreign affiliates but not of inter-office positions.
The consolidated data consists of three types of lending activities: cross-border lending, lending through
foreign affiliates in local currency, and lending through foreign affiliates in foreign currency. The BIS
makes the consolidated data available both at the immediate (starting in 1983) and ultimate exposure
basis (starting in 2005). The former considers the geographical location of the entity the bank lends
to and the later takes into consideration risk transfers such as derivates or guarantees and looks at the
residency of the ultimate guarantor of the claim (BIS, 2009d). This chapter uses data published under
the locational concept because the aim is to understand the cross-border lending flows to the rest of the
48 The Role of Institutions in International Finance
series covers the cross-border assets and liabilities of banks located in up to 43 countries
or territories (“reporting countries”) to more than 200 countries or territories (“vis-à-vis
countries”) on a quarterly basis since 1977. Due to the hub-like nature of international
banking, the data covers nearly all cross-border bank relationships despite its seemingly
limited reporting area.6 It consists of the on-balance sheet exposure of banks and its three
main components are loans and deposits, holdings and own issue of debt securities, and
other assets and liabilities which include mainly portfolio and direct investment. Data on
international assets and liabilities outstanding is originally collected by national monetary
authorities. Flows are estimated by the BIS as exchange rate adjusted changes in the
amounts outstanding to account for valuation effects. Potentially large valuation effects
in capital flows data can arise because exchange rate fluctuations impact the current US
dollar value of non-dollar stocks and thus can mechanically alter the value of assets and lia-
bilities from one period to the next; just taking the difference between stocks can therefore
be inadequate. The BIS uses the currency denomination of assets and liabilities reported
by the national monetary authorities to construct those exchange rate adjusted flows.7
In my analysis I use the data on bank (asset) flows from 18 OECD reporting countries
converted into real terms using the US GDP deflator. I exclude financial off-shore as well
as developing reporting countries from my main analysis. See Appendix 3.A for a list of
countries in the sample and the first year of data available.8
world. Using the locational data has also other advantages: First, a longer time-series for a larger number
of countries is available. Second, exchange rate adjusted flows are available which smooth out valuation
effects that might be especially of concern in relatively long panels such as used in this chapter. And
finally, unlike in the consolidated statistics flows between parent banks and their foreign affiliates are not
excluded.
6The BIS asks countries to contribute to the Locational Banking Statistics as a reporting country once
their cross-border banking activity becomes “substantial” (BIS, 2008). The Locational Banking Statistics
started out with 14 industrial countries encompassing the reporting area in 1977. In its first expansion
in 1983 it added 9 additional countries, both industrial and financial off-shore centers, to its reporting
area. With the addition of one more country in 1987 the reporting area remained constant through the
mid-1990s before BIS started adding more countries, especially in the early 2000s, arriving at today’s
number of reporting countries. See Appendix 3.A for the year each reporting country started contributing
to the Locational Banking Statistics.
7See BIS (2009d) for details on how exchange rate adjusted flows are constructed.
8While aggregate data by country is made publicly available on the BIS website, bilateral data is only
made available to researchers upon request and granted on an individual basis by each reporting country.
Out of the up to 43 reporting countries, 27 countries made their data available. Of the 16 countries
which declined to make their data available are eight financial off-shore centers and three have been added
to the statistics series only in 2008 or later. My sample of 18 OECD reporting countries is similar to




I use the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) political risk rating published by Po-
litical Risk Services to measure institutional quality. The ICRG rating is especially suited
as measure of institutional quality in the context of this chapter as it captures potentially
fast-changing institutional characteristics rather than more permanent characteristics and
exhibits substantial within-country variation.9 As Papaioannou (2009) points out this al-
lows me to test whether improvements in institutional quality over time are associated with
increased capital flows. The possibility that political, legal, or bureaucratic circumstances
might change and endanger their investment is a key risk factor that international investors
face.10
The political risk rating is constructed from 12 variables that measure the effectiveness
and stability of political, legal, and bureaucratic institutions. It ranges in value from 0 to
100 with higher value indicating better institutional quality (or, conversely, lower political
risk). The rating is available since 1984 on a monthly basis for a wide variety of countries
and can therefore be easily merged with the BIS data. The merged dataset contains
information on both bank flows and institutional quality for 136 vis-à-vis countries. See
Appendix 3.B for more details on the variables used to construct the rating.
The political risk rating is one of three risk ratings used to construct the ICRG’s
composite rating. Besides the political risk rating, ICRG also constructs economic and
financial risk ratings based on 50 points and 5 variables each (see Appendix 3.B for details).
To arrive at the composite risk index, the points from the three sub-indices are added and
divided by 2. It thus also ranges in value from 0 to 100 with higher values again indicating
a better institutional quality. Some of the variables incorporated in the financial and
economic risk rating are already explicitly controlled for in the empirical model specification
below. However, as robustness check I test whether the results are sensitive to adding the
financial or economic risk rating or using the composite rating instead.
9Glaeser et al. (2004) draw attention to the fact that because measures of political institutions,
including data from ICRG, have high within-country variation they fail to capture permanent institutions.
10While the ICRG data does not capture more permanent institutions by design – though it does
consider the stability of the governance components – , one could argue that for countries that see very
little within-country variation those institutions are in a sense permanent. In as far as there are underlying,
permanent institutions on the country level and they are time-invariant over the up to 25 year period
covered in the sample, they are captured by the country fixed-effects included in some of the specifications
below.
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3.2.3 Other Variables
Data on other control variables in the dataset comes from a variety of sources. Data on
distance, common language and colonial ties comes from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) while data on GDP per capita, US GDP deflator,
GDP growth, population and real interest rates are taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) database. I construct the variables GDP growth rate dif-
ferential and real interest rate differential by subtracting the value of the reporting country
from the vis-à-vis country.
I combine data from two sources to construct the bilateral exchange rate regime dummy.
First, I use the de facto monthly fine classification of exchange rate regimes from Ilzetzki,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) which is available on a monthly basis for an unbalanced panel
from the 1946 to 2007. I code the exchange rate regime dummy as equal to one if the
vis-à-vis country is either a member of the same currency union as the reporting country
or de facto pegged its currency to that of the reporting country (classification codes 1 to
4). Unfortunately, the Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff dataset is not a bilateral one and
thus does not include information with regard to which country the currency is pegged to
or with which countries it forms a currency union. To turn the dataset into a bilateral
one I use the Klein and Shambaugh (2006) dataset on exchange rate regimes to identify
the counter party country of the currency union or peg. The Klein and Shambaugh data
covers the period 1960 to 2004. Since the Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff data only goes
through 2007 and the Klein and Shambaugh only through 2004 I forward fill the data to
2009 and check the coding against the information in the Country Notes section of the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook for changes in the exchange rate regime
and make adjustments as necessary.
See Appendix 3.C for details on variable definitions and sources.
3.2.4 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 3.1. The average quarterly bank
flow between reporting and vis-à-vis country over the entire sample period is 85 million
in exchange rate adjusted terms in 2000 constant U.S. dollars. This average, however,
masks a large variation as the minimum and maximum value suggest. Note that bank
flows can take negative values. This can occur because bank flows are net flows in the
sense that they include repayments for loans or other investments. Therefore, if scheduled
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repayments of loans or other investments originated in earlier quarters exceed loans or
other reported investments to a given country in the current quarter, bank flows will be
negative (but stocks still positive). About 80 percent of flows fall between -77 million and
163 million with the remaining 20 percent of observations split equally between both tails.
The largest negative flows are, not surprisingly, recorded in 2008 and 2009 to high-income
OECD countries and in particular the United States and the United Kingdom. Likewise
unsurprisingly, the largest positive flows are recorded just before the crisis, in 2006 and 2007
to high-income OECD countries with again the United States and the United Kingdom in
particular.
Institutional quality varies substantially, from an index value of 7 in Liberia to 97
in the Netherlands and Switzerland and with a mean of 65. However, the variation in
institutional quality is not just on the cross-country level. Liberia, for example, saw its
institutional quality plummet to an index value of 7 during its civil war in the early 1990s,
down from values around 40 in the mid-1980s. By the time a peace deal was signed in 1995
its institutional quality rating had improved to values around 30. In subsequent years,
Liberia has been mostly able to improve its institutional quality rating, reaching values
in the high 50s in the late 2000s. Similarly, the index values for the Netherlands and
Switzerland are not constant. They are, however, comparatively stable – ranging in value
from the low 80s to the mid 90s over the entire sample period for both countries – as they
indeed generally do for high-income OECD countries. About 11 percent of the bilateral
relationships in the sample share a common official language and 6 percent share colonial
ties.
Table 3.2 reports the correlation matrix for all bilateral observations in Panel A and
in Panel B the correlation matrix for independent vis-à-vis country-quarter observations
with banks flows averaged across all reporting countries. The correlation matrixes suggest
significant correlations between bank flows and institutional quality, both as captured by
the political risk rating as well as by the economic, financial and composite risk ratings.
Between the three subcategory risk ratings, the political risk rating interestingly shows the
highest correlation coefficient with 0.086 in Panel A and 0.245 in Panel B. This correlation
coefficient estimate is also higher than the correlation coefficient estimates between bank
flows and the traditional gravity control variables such as GDP per capita in the vis-à-vis
country, distance, and the dummies for common language and colonial ties. Excluding
the inter-correlation between the different measures of institutional quality, the highest
correlation coefficient in the table is between GDP per capita in the vis-à-vis country
52 The Role of Institutions in International Finance
and the institutional quality in the vis-à-vis country with correlation coefficients ranging
from 0.63 (economic) to 0.76 (composite) for the different measures in Panel A. Similar
correlations are found in Panel B.11
3.3 Methodology
I use variants of the following empirical specification to estimate the effect of institutional
quality on international bank flows:
Bank Flowsijt = X’itβ + Y’itγ + Z’ijtδ + ζ Institutional Qualityjt
+ η post-2008Q2 * Institutional Qualityjt + θt + εijt (3.1)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of exchange rate adjusted international asset
flows from reporting country i to vis-à-vis country j in quarter t. Vectors X and Y include
control country characteristics in countries i and j, respectively, such as the logarithm of
GDP per capita and vector Z includes bilateral variables such as dummies for common
official language and colonial ties and the logarithm of distance between the two countries.
The specification also includes a vector of time fixed-effects θt. The variable of interest is
institutional quality which is measured primarily with the ICRG political risk rating. The
error term is denoted by εijt.
To capture any potential asymmetric effect of the role of institutions before and after
the financial crisis, I include an interaction term between the post 2008Q2 quarters (already
captured by the time fixed-effects) and institutional quality. I choose the second quarter
of 2008 as the onset of the crisis because it is the first quarter in which international
bank flows fell sharply after years of steady, though not necessarily smooth expansion as
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. While there were signs of the financial crisis to come with
the outbreak of stress in financial markets as early as in summer 2007, the collapse of
the investment bank Bear Stearns in mid-March of 2008 underlined the seriousness of the
crisis for many for the first time. The third quarter saw a short reprieve from the decline
of cross-border bank lending before the flows decreased even further in the wake of the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the bail-out of American International Group (AIG)
in mid September.12
11The within vis-à-vis country correlation coefficients between GDP per capita in the country and the
different institutional quality measures are much lower.
12See Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) for a discussion of how different types of capital flows fared during
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The dependent variable, bank flows, can take negative values. Recall that this can occur
when a reporting country decreases its stock of assets in a given vis-à-vis country, resulting
in negative flows but still positive stocks. Bank flows are net flows in the sense that they
include repayments for loans or other investments. Therefore, if scheduled repayments of
loans or other investments originated in earlier quarters exceed loans or other reported
investments to a given country in the current quarter, bank flows will be negative and the
stock of bank assets in the vis-à-vis countries will decline. Following Papaioannou (2009)
and Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010), who also use BIS bank flow data in their analysis, I
take the logarithm of the absolute value and then change the sign back to the sign of the
original variable. This transformation preserves both the sign of the original variable and
the symmetry between increases and decreases in flows.
The empirical specification is in essence a standard gravity model. First conceived by
Tinbergen (1962), it states in its basic form that trade between two countries is directly
related to their size and inversely to the distance between them. It has since become
a workhorse model for explaining not only bilateral trade flows but also capital flows in
recent years (Wei, 2000a) and been shown to be consistent with theoretical models (Okawa
and Wincoop, 2010).13 In addition to the basic factors of size and distance, gravity models
often include other variables that either promote or deter trade or capital flows such as
dummy variables that indicate a special relationship between country-pairs such as colonial
ties or a common official language.14
The main challenge in identifying the effect of institutions is potential omitted variable
bias. It arises because it is hard to control for all the potential factors that might influence
international lending in a cross-country context. To counter potential omitted variable
bias I will exploit the time-series dimension of the panel and include, next to a pooled
model, two fixed effects (FE) specifications. In particular, I will include one specification
with reporting country FE and vis-à-vis country FE to control for any unobserved time-
invariant country characteristics. The second specification adds FE for each reporting and
vis-à-vis country-pair and thus isolates the within country variation for each country-pair.
Errors are either clustered at the vis-à-vis country or the country-pair level, depending on
different stages of the financial crisis.
13See also the discussion on the empirical model in Chapter 2 where we use a gravity model for foreign
direct investment (FDI).
14The model includes GDP per capita to capture economic size of countries. Others include GDP and
population separately instead which is equivalent to including a per capita measure of economic size. The
results reported below are robust to the alternate specification that includes GDP and population instead
of GDP per capita.
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the FE specification.
A second challenge to identifying the effect of institutions on international capital flows
is that any relationship might be driven by reverse causation. However, unlike in the
omitted variable case, there is no clear way to address this issue. A standard approach to
address potential endogeneity is instrumental variables. Papaioannou (2009), for example,
addresses concerns of endogeneity by using a cross-sectional specification of the average
annual bank lending flows over 1984 to 2002 as dependent variable and the initial (1985)
value of institutional quality on the right-hand side which he also instruments with legal
origin dummies and population density in the year 1500, following approaches in the law
and finance literature (La Porta et al., 1998 and 2008) and the literature on the role of
institution in economic growth (see Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2002). He finds that even
when instrumented the role of institutions is significant. However, this approach has two
drawbacks. First, by collapsing the data into a cross-section this approach renders insti-
tutional quality time-invariant when it is exactly the time-variant nature of the political,
legal, and bureaucratic circumstances that might endanger investments and that this re-
search is interested in. Second, it is not clear that legal origins or population density in the
year 1500 are appropriate instruments. Glaeser et al. (2004) have drawn attention to the
fact that measures of political institutions, including data from ICRG that is used here,
have high within country variation and thus fail to capture permanent institutions. But
it is exactly permanent institutions that the variables legal origins and population density
attempt to measure.
Another approach is the use of lagged values of the variables of interest to temporally
disentangle a potentially endogenous relationship. In unreported robustness checks, I lag
the institutional quality variable by one quarter. The results remain robust to the findings
reported in the following section. Note that by taking the lagged variable approach to the
extreme one arrives at an initial value specification. However, an initial values specification
or even lags of relatively high order create a problem: they take away the time-variation
that this research is interested in.15
3.4 Results
This section reports the main results first for the entire period, including specifications for
the potentially asymmetric effect of institutions before and after the crisis; then for the pre-
15Papaioannou (2009) also employs this approach.
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crisis period, including specifications allowing for the heterogeneous effect of institutions
as international bank lending takes off; and finally for just the post-crisis period to tease
out the role of institutional quality as international bank flows first sharply drop and
subsequently begin to recover.
3.4.1 Entire Period
The OLS estimates of quarterly bilateral bank flows in real terms from 18 reporting coun-
tries to 136 vis-à-vis countries over the entire sample period, 1984 to 2009, are presented
in Tables 3.3 through 3.8. Table 3.3 includes only institutional quality and the standard
gravity controls as independent variables while additional control variables are added in
Tables 3.4 through 3.8.
Specification (1) in Table 3.3 reports the results of a standard gravity model of inter-
national bank flows for the pooled model.16 The coefficient estimates are in line with
expectations: bilateral flows are larger the richer the reporting country. The positive
coefficient of the GDP per capita variable for the vis-à-vis country provides evidence for the
Lucas paradox that capital flows to rich countries. The dummy for colonial ties enters with
a significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that shared historical linkages and possibly
institutional familiarity or even similarity do increase bank flows. Distance also enters
significantly, but as expected negatively as distance here proxies for costs of informational
distance that increases with physical distance (Portes and Rey, 2005). The dummy for
sharing an official language is insignificant.
Specification (2) adds the institutional quality variable to the model which enters pos-
itively and significantly. The coefficient estimate implies that a 10 point increase in in-
stitutional quality is associated with an on average 14 percent increase in international
banking flows to the vis-à-vis country over the entire sample period. Specification (3) adds
16In unreported results I also control for the lagged exchange rate by including either the nominal
effective exchange rate or real effective exchange rate for both the reporting and the vis-à-vis countries
as they may explain some of the results. In the model with the nominal effective exchange rates, the
exchange rates are only statistically significant in the model specification without any reporting and vis-
à-vis or country-pair FEs. In the model with the real effective exchange rates, the rates are significantly
negative for the reporting country and significantly positive but virtually zero for the vis--vis country
across all model specifications. In either case the coefficient estimates on the other variables remain stable
compared to the baseline model without any exchange rate control variables. Including the exchange rates
reduces the sample size by 40 percent due to limited data availability. Because of the stability of the
variable coefficients, significant sample reduction and the fact that bank flows are reported on an exchange
rate adjusted basis and thus mitigating the concerns, I have chosen to not include exchange rates in my
baseline model.
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an interaction term between institutional quality and the post-crisis period to allow for
potential heterogeneous effects of institutional quality before and after the retrenchment
of cross-border capital flows in the second quarter of 2008. The interaction effect is sig-
nificantly negative and about twice the size of the level effect, indicating that after the
onset of the financial crisis there was a reversal in the relationship between institutional
quality and bank flows. Instead of higher institutional quality leading to more capital
inflows, higher institutional quality post-crisis is associated with lower cross-border bank
lending. Given that the countries that typically achieve high institutional ratings, that is
high-income OECD countries, were particularly affected by the crisis one might wonder
whether those results are driven by banks scaling back on lending to those countries most
affected by the crisis. To test this hypothesis I include a measure of the cost of the financial
crisis below and run a number of robustness checks.
Before turning to those robustness checks, however, I repeat the analysis of the first
three columns by first adding reporting and vis-à-vis country FE in columns (4) to (6)
and country-pair FE in columns (7) to (9). Even though the addition of FE changes the
interpretation from one of cross-country variation to one of within country variation in
columns (7) to (9), the coefficients remain remarkably stable across the specifications: the
results suggest that a 10 point improvement in institutional quality is not only associated
with a 14 percent increase in bank lending inflows across countries (column (2)) but also
within countries (column (8)).
Such improvements in institutional quality within a country are not unusual. As already
discussed in the summary statistics section, Liberia increased its institutional quality rating
from its absolute bottom of 7 points during the civil war to almost 30 points over a two-
year period between 1993 and 1995, when a peace deal was signed. Vietnam is another
example of a country that saw a swift increase in institutional quality. From the first to
the second quarter of 1993 Vietnam increased its rating from 55 to 64 index points as
its implementation of economic reform under Doi Moi – which involved the dismantling
of central planning, the promotion of private business, the liberalization of trade and an
increase in political liberties – took hold. Similarly, Chile saw an increase in its institutional
quality rating of six points in the year after the fall of the military regime under Pinochet.
Chile further improved its rating up to a high of 82.5 index points in the second quarter
of 2006 as its democratic institutions evolved and it implemented economic reforms of
deregulation. This compares to values in the mid-40s under Pinochet in the mid-1980s.
To check whether the differential impact for high and low institution countries is unique
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to the financial crisis of 2008 I test whether there was also a differential impact following the
Dot-Com crisis in the early 2000s. In Table 3.4 I therefore add an additional interaction
effect for institutions during the period second quarter 2000 (bursting of the Dot-Com
bubble) to last quarter of 2001 (official end of the recession) to the baseline model. The
interaction effect is insignificant across all specifications. This provides some evidence
that high and low institution countries did not experience a differential impact during a
previous economic downturn and that the differential impact of institution in the post
2008Q2 period is due to fall in international bank lending during the recent financial crisis,
not a likely general feature of economic downturn in reporting countries.
Table 3.5 includes a variable that measures the cost of the financial crisis of 2008 as
percent of GDP from Laeven and Valencia (2010) to test whether the negative effect of
institutions during the crisis is driven by the pull back of money from countries most af-
fected by the crisis. The cost of the financial crisis is computed as the cumulative difference
between actual and trend real GDP for a period of three years since the start of the crisis,
that is here 2008–2010, with higher values indicating a greater cost.17 It is set to zero
before the onset of the financial crisis (second quarter of 2008) and also set to zero if no
output loss due to the crisis is recorded. I include the cost of the crisis for both the re-
porting and the vis-à-vis country as one would expect that the severity of the crisis affects
both how much a reporting country lends as well as how much a vis-à-vis country receives
in international bank lending.
This expectation is confirmed for both the reporting and the vis-à-vis country. The
highly significant and negative coefficient estimate on the cost of the crisis in the reporting
country suggests that cross-border bank lending decreases by 0.5 percent for each per-
centage point increase in the cost of the crisis across reporting countries in specifications
(1) through (3). The coefficient estimate is similarly negative and highly significant when
measuring the cost of the crisis in the vis-à-vis country. This suggests that countries which
experienced a relatively more severe economic contraction due to the financial crisis saw
less cross-border banking inflows with inflows decreasing by 1.4 (0.7) percent for each per-
centage point increase in the cost of the crisis in the vis-à-vis country in columns (1) and
(2) (column (3) with interaction effect). On the one hand, this might have been driven
by less demand in the vis-à-vis country which might have resulted in fewer investment
opportunities. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that banks reacted to the overall
macroeconomic situation and a (perceived) increase in risk and, as a result, banks were
17For the United States and the United Kingdom Laeven and Valencia (2010) consider the start of the
crisis to be in 2007 and calculate the cost of the crisis accordingly for the period 2007-2009.
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more reluctant to invest in countries affected most by the financial crisis.
The results largely hold once separate reporting and vis-à-vis country FE are included
in columns (4) to (6) and country-pair FE are included in columns (7) to (9) though the
size of the coefficient estimates, especially in the vis-à-vis country, increases. The inclusion
of the variable measuring the cost of the financial crisis, however, does not alter the result
of the role of institutions found in the benchmark results of Table 3.3: better institutional
quality leads to more cross-border lending in the pre-crisis period but this relationship
breaks down after the onset of the financial crisis.
However, bank flows may have not only responded to the economic conditions in a
country but may also have contributed to the severity of the crisis. To mitigate those
endogeneity concerns, in Table 3.6 I replace the cost of the financial crisis for both the
reporting and vis-à-vis country by a dummy variable equal to one if the country experienced
a banking crisis and zero otherwise. The results indicate that the reporting and vis-à-vis
countries that experience a banking crisis send and receive, respectively, less cross-border
lending. As before, the role of institutions remains relatively robust to the inclusion of
the banking crisis dummies: better institutional quality leads to more cross-border lending
in the pre-crisis period but the relationship once again breaks down after the onset of the
financial crisis. However, in the specification controlling for reporting and vis-à-vis country
FE in columns (4) to (6) and country-pair FE in columns (7) to (9) the interaction term
decreases in absolute size to 0.18 – or about half its size compared to the baseline results
in Table 3.3 – which, combined with the coefficient estimate for the level effect of 0.14,
results in an overall effect closer to zero compared to the baseline results.
Yet another way to test whether the negative effect of institutions during the crisis is
driven by the pull back of money from countries most affected by the crisis is to control for
non-performing loans (NPLs) as percentage of total loans. The share of NPLs is a proxy
for the soundness of lending practices and the prediction is that higher NPL ratios result in
increasing cross-border lending for the reporting country but a reduction in international
bank lending for vis-à-vis countries.
Comparable cross-country data on NPLs as percentage of total loans is available from
the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report on an annual basis since 2005 for up to 101
countries. Table 3.7 reports the results of including the NPL share for both the reporting
and vis-à-vis country as additional variables in the baseline specification for the period
2005 to 2009. As expected, I find that the non-performing loan ratio is significant for
both the reporting country (positive) and the vis-à-vis country (negative). An exception
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are the specifications controlling for country-pair FE; here the NPL ratio is statistically
insignificant for the reporting country. Compared to the baseline specification the coeffi-
cient estimates on the institutional quality variable and its interaction term yield the same
overall effect. However, when the level and interaction term are combined, the negative ef-
fect is comparatively closer to zero. This provides more corroborating evidence that banks
scaled back lending especially to those countries most affected by the crisis.
The results from Table 3.3 regarding the role of institutions also hold once the additional
control variables growth rate differential, real interest rate differential, and exchange rate
regime dummy are added in Table 3.8. The three additional variables each proxy pull-
factors for international banking flows. Higher growth and interest rates in the vis-à-vis
country compared to the reporting country signal better investment opportunities and
should, ceteris paribus, attract more bank flows to the vis-à-vis country. On the other hand,
a stable bilateral exchange rate eliminates one of the risks of foreign investment, namely
uncertain returns due to potential exchange rate fluctuations. Vis-à-vis countries should
therefore also see increased bank flows if their exchange rate is in a stable relationship to
the reporting country either through a currency union or de facto peg.
The results in Table 3.8 indicate that none of the additional controls are significant in
the pooled specification or the specification with separate reporting and vis-à-vis country
FE in columns (1) to (6). However, the coefficients on the exchange rate regime dummy
and the variable measuring the growth rate differential are significant and as expected
positive when explaining the within country variation in the country-pair FE models. This
suggests that within a bilateral relationship international lending increases as the exchange
rate between the currencies becomes fixed and the growth rate differential increases.
Note that the inclusion of the additional variables significantly reduces the sample size.
In an exercise not reported here, I have run the specification of Table 3.3 for the sample
of Table 3.8 and the results remain comparable to the original estimates of the maximum
sample. The results of Table 3.8 can thus be compared to the ones in Table 3.3.
I next turn to analyze the pre-crisis and post-crisis period separately.
3.4.2 Pre-Crisis Period
Table 3.9 essentially repeats the analysis of Table 3.3 for the pre-crisis period, covering
the years 1984–2007. Instead of including a dummy variable for the onset of the financial
crisis and its interaction term with institutional quality as in Table 3.3, Table 3.9 includes
a dummy variable equal to one for the observations after 2003. This allows me to test
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whether the role of institutional quality in promoting cross-border lending has changed
in light of the steadily increasing flows during this period. Alfaro et al. (2008) and
Papaioannou (2009), who have previously examined the relationship between institutional
quality and international bank lending flows, only analyze data through 2000 and 2002,
respectively, and therefore miss most of the boom period in international bank lending.
The results reported in Table 3.9 largely confirm the findings in Table 3.3 and suggest that
better institutions promote international bank lending. The interaction effect is positive
and significant at the one percent level and about 1.5 times as large as the level effect.
The results in column (3) suggest that a 10 point increase in institutional quality leads to
an 11 percent increase international bank flows in the years up to 2002. The coefficient
estimate on the interaction term indicates that this effect increases to 28 percent for the
period 2003 to 2007. This finding holds across all specifications, the pooled one and the
ones controlling for reporting and vis-à-vis country FE and country-pair FE.
3.4.3 Crisis and Initial Recovery Period Only
In Table 3.10 I turn to analyze in more detail the period after the onset of the crisis to
sample end, that is the period from the second quarter of 2008 to the last quarter of 2009. I
do this by including interaction effects with institutional quality for each quarter separately
to tease out the role of institutional quality as international bank flows first sharply drop
and subsequently begin to recover.
The estimates in the pooled specification in column (1) indicate that the coefficient
estimate for institutional quality is still significant and positive for the second quarter of
2008, the omitted base quarter. However, its interaction effects for all subsequent quarters
show that the relationship is first weakening in the third quarter before turning overall
negative in the fourth quarter of 2008. During the first two quarters of 2009 the negative
interaction coefficients become progressively smaller, turning the overall effect even positive
in the second quarter. But the return to a positive net effect of institutional quality as
international bank lending recovers does not last and by the fourth quarter of 2009 the
coefficient estimates again suggest an overall negative effect.
When controlling for reporting and vis-à-vis country FE and country-pair FE effects,
the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms follow a similar pattern though the level
effect is not significantly positive. This means that when looking at the within country
variation and within country-pair variation, respectively, the relationship between institu-
tional quality and cross-border bank flows is negative or at best breaks down and is not
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significantly different from zero.
3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Are Results Driven by Banks Avoiding Countries Most
Affected by Financial Crisis?
The results in Table 3.3 above suggest that there is a reversal in the relationship between
institutional quality and bank flows after the onset of the financial crisis. Instead of higher
institutional quality leading to more capital inflows, higher institutional quality after the
onset of the crisis is associated with lower cross-border bank lending. To test whether this
effect is driven by the high-income, high institutional quality countries that were affected
the most by the financial crisis, I have controlled for the cost of the financial crisis and the
presence of a banking crisis in both the reporting and vis-à-vis country in Table 3.5 above.
Here, I consider two sub-samples as further robustness tests.
First, I exclude high-income OECD vis-à-vis countries from the sample. The results
are reported in Table 3.11 and show that while the level effect of the institutional quality
variable remains about the same, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term halves.
The combined effect is still negative or at least cancels out suggesting that the positive
relationship between international bank lending and institutional quality has broken down
across all specifications even when excluding high-income OECD countries. It also provides
some evidence for the suggestion that the negative effect of institutional quality found in
the earlier tables could be interpreted as compensation for overinvestment in high quality,
high-income countries during the boom period in international banking flows.18
Second, I consider only cross-border bank lending to 33 emerging markets countries as
covered by the S&P Emerging Markets Index.19 The emerging markets countries sample
by virtue of construction includes countries that have significant investment opportunities
available while at the same time their institutional environment tends to be at a lower level
18In unreported results I also test whether the results might be driven by dynamics between countries in
the European Union. To that end I exclude EU member countries both as reporting and vis-à-vis countries
from the sample. The results with regard to the relative effect of institutional quality before and after the
onset of the financial crisis are comparable to the results of Table 3.11.
19The 33 countries are: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe. A 34th country included in the S&P Emerging
Markets Index, Taiwan, is excluded due to data availability issues.
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and less stable than that of industrialized nations. They thus comprise a selection of coun-
tries which might benefit in particular from offering a relatively high-quality institutional
environment to investors. Emerging markets countries, as a whole, have also not been
as significantly affected by the financial crisis compared to their developed counterparts
(Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).
The results reported in Table 3.12 suggest that emerging markets countries with a better
institutional quality are indeed attracting more cross-border lending and the coefficient
estimate on the level effect is with 0.017 slightly higher than that for the entire country
sample in Table 3.3 with 0.014 in the pooled models in columns (2). This suggests that in
the emerging markets sample a 10 point increase in institutional quality yields a 17 percent
increase in cross-border bank lending to the vis-à-vis country compared to a 15 percent
increase in the overall sample. Similar to the all-country specification the interaction term
added in column (3) is significantly negative though with minus 12 percent it is less than
half as large. When combined with the level effect, the results suggest that emerging
countries with better institutions continue to enjoy a positive albeit small advantage in
attracting capital flows. Again, these results hold when controlling for reporting and vis-
à-vis country FE and country-pair FE. This finding is in line with results by Gelos and
Wei (2005) who provide evidence that during the Asian and Russian crisis of 1997 to 1998
managers of equity funds with investments in emerging markets avoided less transparent
countries to a larger extent.
3.5.2 Are Results Sensitive to Adding Other Institutional Di-
mensions?
As discussed in the data section, my measure of institutional quality, the political risk
rating, is one of three sub-indices ICRG uses to construct its composite risk rating. The
high correlation coefficients between the sub-indices reported in Table 3.2 might raise the
concern that rather than capturing the political, legal, or bureaucratic circumstances my
measure of institutional quality actually captures the macroeconomic or financial situation
of a country as captured by the economic and financial risk ratings, respectively. This
section explores the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of the other two components,
the economic and financial risk ratings, as well as to the use of the composite risk rating
instead of the political risk rating. Results are reported in Tables 3.13 through 3.15.
I first augment my baseline model with the economic risk rating. The coefficient esti-
mate on the economic risk rating variable is positive and significant throughout except in
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the pooled model in column (2). The addition of the economic risk rating does not dimin-
ish the effect of the (political) institutional quality measure, which remains in magnitude
similar to the coefficient estimates reported in Table 3.3. Its interaction term with the
crisis and recovery period dummy is only significant in the specifications controlling for
country-pair FE. Contrary to the interaction term with institutional quality, the interac-
tion term with the economic risk rating is significantly positive. This divergence of signs in
the post 2008 period provides evidence that the two variables do indeed measure different
concepts and each is significant in its own way.20
In the next table, I replace the economic risk rating with the financial risk rating and
find that financial conditions as measured by the index are not significant when included as
level and interaction effect in the pooled specification and the separate reporting and vis-à-
vis country FE specification. In the country-pair FE specification, however, the level effect
registers positively significant at the 5 percent level in column (5). Once the interaction
term is added in column (6), however, the level effect becomes insignificant and even
turns signs. The interaction term itself is positive and significant at the 5 percent level
suggesting that as the financial risk rating improves within a country so does international
bank lending after the onset of the financial crisis. Again, however, the size, sign, and
magnitude of the coefficients on the institutional quality variable and its interaction term
remain unchanged from the estimations in Table 3.3. This suggests that the financial risk
rating and the political risk rating do indeed measure distinct concepts.21
Finally, I substitute the composite risk rating for the (political) institutional quality
variable in Table 3.15 and examine its effect on international capital flows. The composite
risk rating variable is highly significant throughout and positive when included as level
effect and negative when included as part of the interaction term. The relative sizes of
the coefficients mimic those of the institutional quality variable with the interaction effect
about twice as large in absolute size. Given the construction of the composite risk rating –
the political risk index is given twice the weight of each of the economic and financial risk
rating – this outcome is not too much of a surprise. However, the results for including the
20Given that the correlation coefficient between the political risk rating and the economic risk rating
is 0.637 multicollinearity might be a concern. In unreported results I regress the economic risk rating on
the political risk rating and only included the residual, i.e the part that is not correlated with the political
risk rating. The results do not change qualitatively.
21Similarly to the multicollinearity concerns regarding the economic risk rating discussed in the previous
footnote, multicollinearity might also be of concern with the financial risk rating. Its correlation coefficient
with the political risk rating is 0.729. In unreported results I regress the financial risk rating on the political
risk rating and only included the residual, that is the part that is not correlated with the political risk
rating. As for the economic risk rating, the results do not change qualitatively.
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economic and financial risk rating separately have shown that each index measures distinct
concepts that affect international bank lending flows differently.
3.5.3 Does it Matter to Which Sector Bank Lending Goes?
Lastly, I exploit the sectoral breakdown of international bank lending provided by the BIS
to examine whether institutional quality matters more for lending to some sectors than
to others. The sectoral breakdown provided as part of the data series is rather coarse;
it only differentiates between lending to the financial sector versus lending to the non-
financial sector. The results in Table 3.16 suggest that, compared to lending to all sectors,
institutional quality appears to be of lesser consequence when it comes to lending to the
non-bank sector in a given vis-à-vis country. While the coefficients are similar in sign and
significance – a positive main effect that is overpowered by the negative interaction term
in the period after the onset of the financial crisis – their size is only about half as large
compared to flows to all sectors. Again, this holds across all specifications.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter examines the role of institution in promoting international bank lending before
and after the global financial crisis of 2008. The results indicate that there appears to be an
asymmetric relationship between institutional quality and cross-border bank flows during
periods of boom and bust in international bank lending.
Using a panel of bilateral cross-border bank flows to up to 136 countries between 1984
and 2009 the results confirm earlier findings in the literature that better institutions pro-
mote cross-border bank lending in the years leading up to the financial crisis. This includes
the period of rapidly rising flows from 2003 to 2007, a period that had not yet been stud-
ied in this context. The results, however, also indicate that this relationship breaks down
during and in the immediate wake of the financial crisis of 2008. The positive relationship
disappears in the overall sample, and, driven by flows to high-income, high institutional
quality OECD countries, indeed even turns negative. This finding holds across a number
of specifications and several robustness tests such as controlling for the cost of the financial
crisis or presence of a banking crisis in the reporting and vis-à-vis countries; controlling for
non-performing loans as percentage of total loans in the reporting and vis-à-vis countries;
controlling for additional macroeconomic variables such as growth rate and interest rate
differentials between country-pairs and bilateral exchange rate regimes; and controlling for
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indices of economic and financial performance. It is also robust across flows to both the
banking and non-banking sector as well as to the exclusion of high-income OECD countries
from the sample. Interestingly, the relationship does not completely break down when only
considering a sample of emerging markets vis-à-vis countries. Emerging markets countries
appear to still hold an advantage in attracting cross-border bank lending flows. However,
after the onset of the crisis a better institutional environment only promotes international
lending inflows at a quarter of its pre-crisis rate.
The findings are the result of surveying the immediate effects in the crisis and nascent
recovery period. By necessity, the results are therefore tentative. As more data becomes
available over time it will be worthwhile to examine whether this general break down in the
relationship between international capital flows and institutional quality indeed persists or
whether there might be an eventual return to the pre-crisis relationship as cross-border
banking flows recover.
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(b) Panel B: 2006 to 2009
Figure 3.1: Quarterly Bank Flows Vis-à-vis All Countries in U.S. Dollars.
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(b) Panel B: 2006 to 2009
Figure 3.2: Quarterly Bank Flows Vis-à-vis All Countries as Percentage of GDP.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bank Flows 182051 85.2787 2328.0 -199165.5 160061.6
Institutional Quality (Political Risk Rating) 182051 65.3125 15.2986 7 97
Economic Risk Rating 182051 34.0724 7.0857 1 50
Financial Risk Rating 182051 34.4888 8.6805 6 50
Composite Risk Rating 182051 66.9791 13.9227 12.5 96
GDP per capita Reporting, (log) 182051 10.0099 0.3088 9.1083 10.6142
GDP per capita Vis-à-vis, (log) 182051 7.9193 1.6195 4.1309 10.9400
Dummy==1 if common language 182051 0.1138 0.3175 0 1
Dummy==1 if colonial ties 182051 0.0573 0.2323 0 1
Distance (log) 182051 8.4495 0.8908 4.0879 9.8826
Dummy==1 if currency union or peg 167435 0.0812 0.2731 0 1
GDP growth rate differential 181623 1.2631 5.7351 -59.4974 104.7162
Real Interest Rate differential 117296 2.3197 25.9056 -109.7255 787.4685

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































80 The Role of Institutions in International Finance
Table 3.10: Post-Crisis Bilateral Quarterly Bank
Flows, 2008Q1 to 2009
(1) (2) (3)
GDP per capita Reporting, (log) -0.539*** -3.688 -3.492
(0.000) (0.191) (0.330)
GDP per capita Vis-à-vis, (log) -0.188*** 7.881*** 7.934***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy==1 if common language -0.103 0.057
(0.316) (0.624)
Dummy==1 if colonial ties 0.347** 0.412**
(0.045) (0.035)
Distance (log) 0.097 0.020
(0.112) (0.844)
Institutional Quality 0.050*** 0.058 0.058
(0.000) (0.218) (0.152)
x 2008Q3 -0.022** -0.023** -0.023*
(0.049) (0.042) (0.056)
x 2008Q4 -0.076*** -0.078*** -0.078***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x 2009Q1 -0.048*** -0.035** -0.035***
(0.001) (0.021) (0.005)
x 2009Q2 -0.024** -0.011 -0.011
(0.016) (0.268) (0.386)
x 2009Q3 -0.031** -0.019 -0.018
(0.010) (0.146) (0.145)
x 2009Q4 -0.058*** -0.046*** -0.045***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Constant 3.500*** -43.194 -32.727
(0.007) (0.197) (0.413)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Country FE Yes
Vis-à-vis Country FE Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes
N 13,770 13,770 13,770
# Reporting Countries 18 18 18
# Vis-à-vis Countries 135 135 135
# of Cluster 135 135 2,021
Adjusted R-squared 0.029 0.041 0.011
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is log of quarterly bank flows in log of mio of con-
stant 2000 US$.
Errors clustered at vis-a-vis country-level for (1) to (6) and the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.13: Bilateral Quarterly Bank Flows, Adding Economic Institutions, 1984
to 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita Reporting, (log) 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.298** 0.302** 0.325** 0.329**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.017) (0.034) (0.035)
GDP per capita Vis-à-vis, (log) 0.016 0.026 0.168 0.206 0.171** 0.209***
(0.517) (0.311) (0.235) (0.152) (0.016) (0.004)
Dummy==1 if common language -0.002 -0.000 0.012 0.012
(0.970) (0.996) (0.778) (0.779)
Dummy==1 if colonial ties 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.188** 0.188**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017)
Distance (log) -0.194*** -0.195*** -0.266*** -0.264***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional Quality (Political) 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Risk Rating 0.007* 0.004 0.012*** 0.008* 0.012*** 0.008***
(0.078) (0.253) (0.004) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000)
x post 2008Q2 (Political) -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x post 2008Q2 (Economic) 0.009 0.014 0.014**
(0.307) (0.124) (0.022)
Constant -0.111 1.804*** -2.122 -2.743* -6.175*** -5.490***
(0.800) (0.001) (0.174) (0.080) (0.000) (0.001)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Country FE Yes Yes
Vis-à-vis Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes Yes
N 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051
# Reporting Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
# Vis-à-vis Countries 136 136 136 136 136 136
# of Cluster 136 136 136 136 2,105 2,105
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.020 0.027 0.027 0.031 0.031
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is log of quarterly bank flows in log of mio of constant 2000 US$.
Errors clustered at vis-a-vis country-level for (1) to (6) and the countrypair-level in (6) to (9). P-values
reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.14: Bilateral Quarterly Bank Flows, Adding Financial Institutions, 1984
to 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita Reporting, (log) 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.296** 0.298** 0.323** 0.324**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.019) (0.018) (0.035) (0.035)
GDP per capita Vis-à-vis, (log) 0.024 0.036 0.201 0.226 0.205*** 0.230***
(0.295) (0.134) (0.163) (0.109) (0.004) (0.001)
Dummy==1 if common language 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012
(0.968) (0.962) (0.778) (0.779)
Dummy==1 if colonial ties 0.249*** 0.248*** 0.189** 0.188**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017)
Distance (log) -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.265*** -0.264***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional Quality (Political) 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial Risk Rating 0.003 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005** -0.002
(0.366) (0.743) (0.187) (0.775) (0.017) (0.474)
x post 2008Q2 (Political) -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x post 2008Q2 (Financial) 0.007 0.013 0.014**
(0.542) (0.264) (0.035)
Constant -0.058 1.898*** -2.140 -2.683* -6.225*** -5.358***
(0.895) (0.001) (0.170) (0.083) (0.000) (0.002)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Country FE Yes Yes
Vis-à-vis Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes Yes
N 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051
# Reporting Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
# Vis-à-vis Countries 136 136 136 136 136 136
# of Cluster 136 136 136 136 2,105 2,105
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.020 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.031
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is log of quarterly bank flows in log of mio of constant 2000 US$.
Errors clustered at vis-a-vis country-level for (1) to (6) and the countrypair-level in (6) to (9). P-values
reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.15: Bilateral Quarterly Bank Flows, Composite Risk Index, 1984 to 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita Reporting, (log) 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.301** 0.302** 0.328** 0.330**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.017) (0.035) (0.035)
GDP per capita Vis-à-vis, (log) 0.024 0.033 0.186 0.226 0.189*** 0.229***
(0.336) (0.215) (0.217) (0.130) (0.009) (0.002)
Dummy==1 if common language 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.012
(0.971) (0.939) (0.775) (0.777)
Dummy==1 if colonial ties 0.247*** 0.245*** 0.188** 0.188**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.017) (0.018)
Distance (log) -0.200*** -0.199*** -0.264*** -0.263***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Composite Risk Rating 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x post 2008Q2 -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.066 2.202*** -2.166 -2.858* -6.266*** -5.610***
(0.882) (0.000) (0.172) (0.075) (0.000) (0.001)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Country FE Yes Yes
Vis-à-vis Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes Yes
N 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051 182,051
# Reporting Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
# Vis-à-vis Countries 136 136 136 136 136 136
# of Cluster 136 136 136 136 2,105 2,105
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.031
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is log of quarterly bank flows in log of mio of constant 2000 US$.
Errors clustered at vis-a-vis country-level for (1) to (6) and the countrypair-level in (6) to (9). P-values
reported in parentheses.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.A: BIS Sample Reporting
Countries

















17 United Kingdom 1977
18 United States 1977
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Table 3.B: ICRG Risk Rating Methodology
Political Risk Rating
The rating ranges in value from 0 to 100 with higher value indicating better institutional
quality (or lower political risk). It is constructed from the following 12 variables with the
number in parenthesis indicating the maximal number of points that can be achieved per
variable: (1) Government Stability, which rates government unity, legislative strength,
and popular support (12); (2) Socioeconomic Conditions, which rates unemployment,
consumer confidence, and poverty (12); (3) Investment Profile, which rates contract via-
bility/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays (12); (4) Internal Conflict,
which rates civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence, and civil disorder (12); (5)
External Conflicts, which rates war, cross-border conflict, and foreign pressures (12); (6)
Corruption (6); (7) Military in Politics (6); (8) Religious Tensions (6); (9) Law and Order
(6); (10) Ethnic Tensions (6); (11) Democratic Accountability (6); (12) Bureaucracy
Quality (6).
Economic Risk Rating
The rating ranges in value from 0 to 50 with higher value indicating better institutional
quality (or lower economic risk). It is constructed from the following 5 variables with the
number in parenthesis indicating the maximal number of points that can be achieved per
variable: (1) GDP per capita (5); (2) Real GDP Growth (10); (3) Annual Inflation Rate
(10); (4) Budget Balance as Percentage of GDP (10); (5) Current Account as Percentage
of GDP (15).
Financial Risk Rating
The rating ranges in value from 0 to 50 with higher value indicating better institutional
quality (or lower financial risk). It is constructed from the following 5 variables with the
number in parenthesis indicating the maximal number of points that can be achieved
per variable: (1) Foreign Debt as Percentage of GDP (10); (2) Foreign Debt Service as
Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services (10); (3) Current Account as a Percentage of
Exports of Goods and Services (15); (4) Net International Liquidity as Month of Import
Cover (10); (5) Exchange Rate Stability (10).































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Is Small Beautiful? Financial
Structure, Size and Access to
Finance1
1This chapter is based on joint work with Thorsten Beck (Tilburg University and CEPR) and Asli
Demirgüç-Kunt (The World Bank). A version of this chapter has been published as World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 5806. We are grateful for comments from participants at the World Bank confer-
ence on Financial Structure, especially our discussant Jung Wan, Sergio Schmukler as well as from three
anonymous referees.
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4.1 Introduction
The structure of the financial system is again in the headlines. Moving beyond the ques-
tions of banks vs. markets, policy makers are looking for advice on which kind of financial
institutions and which market structures serve best in pushing out the access frontier.
Which institutions are best suited to expand financial services to low-end customers, in-
cluding small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)? Are these banks which can exploit
scale and technological capacity, or specialized lenders, such as leasing or factoring compa-
nies, which can offer expertise in tailored lending products, or low-end financial institutions
such as credit unions which are closest to customers? Similarly, are small or large financial
institutions better in serving low-end customers? On the one hand, large institutions can
exploit scale economies and better diversify risks; on the other hand, small institutions
might have better local market knowledge and flatter hierarchies, both of which facilitate
serving low-end customers.
Combining two unique data sets, this chapter explores the relationship between financial
structure and access to finance. We capture financial structure in two ways. We consider
the importance of different financial institutions – including low-end financial institutions,
specialized lenders and banks – by calculating their asset share relative to total assets
and the average size of these institutions. Firms’ access to financial services is measured
by account and lending services. In addition, we explore the potential heterogeneity of
these relationships both across countries at different levels of economic development, across
industries with different needs for external finance and across firms of different sizes. This
allows us to take into account the different needs and capacities of countries in supporting
different financial structures, different constraints of firms of different sizes and different
needs for external finance across different industries.
The relationship between financial structure and access to finance is a critical question
for policy makers. Access to financial services, especially by SMEs, has become critical in
many developing countries. SMEs make up a large part of the emerging private sector in
most countries, but are also more constrained in their access to financial services than large
firms (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2007; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic,
2005). While micro-finance has helped alleviate access to finance by the poor by adopting
specific lending techniques such as group lending, it seems less conducive to easing financing
constraints of more formal and larger enterprises. More recently, specific financing forms
such as leasing or factoring have been promoted as conducive to easing financing constraints
of SMEs, as they are based on the underlying assets and cash flows rather than borrowers’
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financial history (Berger and Udell, 2006). On the other hand, banks, particularly large
banks, have also shown increased interest in SME financing, exploiting scale economies
and technology (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2011a). The question on the
size of financial institutions – often intertwined with the ownership question – is directly
related to entry barriers and minimum capital requirements imposed by policy makers in
developing countries to foster a specific market structure (Beck et al., 2011b; Beck et al.,
2011c and World Bank, 2011).
This chapter uses a unique dataset to shed light on the relationship between the struc-
ture of the financial system and the size of its institutions, on the one hand, and access to
financial services by enterprises, on the other hand. Specifically, using data from the World
Bank and IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), we are able to compute
both the relative importance of different segments of the financial system that cater to
low-end customers, such as SMEs, as well as the average size of institutions within this
segment. We then match these country-level indicators to firm-level indicators from the
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys on actual use of deposit and loan services by enterprises
in developing and emerging countries. In addition, we examine the relationship between
financial structure and firms’ access to finance across countries at different levels of GDP
per capita, across firms of different sizes, and across industries with different needs of exter-
nal finance, to thus take explicitly into account the potential cross-county, cross-firm and
cross-industry heterogeneity in the effect of financial structure on firms’ access to finance.
Our research speaks to several literatures. First, the financial structure literature has
discussed the implications of bank- vs. market-based financial systems for firm, industry
and GDP per capita growth,2 but has not considered the importance of other segments of
the financial system, including specialized lenders such as leasing, finance or factoring com-
panies or low-end financial institutions such as cooperatives, credit unions and microfinance
institutions. This chapter is the first, to our knowledge, that explores the relationship be-
tween the importance of these two segments focused on SME lending for access to finance
by enterprises. Theory and literature offer different predictions on the effect of importance
of these segments on firms’ access to finance. On the one hand, specialized lenders can
exploit their expertise in specific lending products such as leasing and factoring to improve
firms’ access to external finance. Similarly, low-end financial institutions might have an
advantage in working with smaller and less formal enterprises than banks, as they are
2For the relationship between the degree to which a country is bank- or market-based and firm,
industry and GDP per capita growth, see Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), Beck and Levine (2002)
and Levine (2002), respectively.
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closer to the client and might have more adequate organizational structures, such as flat
hierarchies, and lending techniques, such as group lending.3 On the other hand, banks have
a larger scale and technical capacity to cater to a large number of low-end clients (De la
Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2010). They might be therefore in a better position
to invest in technology and risk management systems than other financial institutions.
Second, our research speaks to a large literature on the effects of the size of financial
institutions on firms’ access to financial services (Berger, Hasan and Klapper, 2004). This
literature has focused mostly on the size of banks, but has not come to an unambiguous
result. On the one hand, smaller banks might be closer to the client and can use relationship
lending to effectively serve small and medium-sized enterprises. On the other hand, larger
banks might have an advantage in using transaction-based lending techniques such as
leasing or factoring. While this literature has focused on banks, we expand it to consider the
relationship between the average size of low-end financial institutions, specialized lenders
and access to finance by enterprises. Similar arguments as for banks can be made for non-
bank institutions. On the one hand, smaller institutions might be closer to the client; on
the other hand, larger institutions might serve these clients more effectively by exploiting
their scale.
Our results suggest that the dominance by banks in most financial systems of devel-
oping markets is associated with a lower use of financial services by firms of all sizes. A
larger share of low-end financial institutions and specialized lenders, on the other hand,
is associated with higher use of financial services in low-income and lower middle-income,
but not necessarily in upper middle-income countries. Large financial institutions, on the
other hand, are not necessarily associated with lower use of financial services. To the con-
trary, larger specialized lenders and larger banks might actually ease small firms’ financing
constraints, while large low-end financial institutions seem to impede access to financial
institutions only for medium-sized and large enterprises. And larger low-end financial
institutions might actually be better in easing access to finance in low-income countries.
Before proceeding, an important caveat is due. Our results derive from cross-sectional
variation across countries and although we control for an array of firm and country charac-
teristics, we can therefore not completely exclude the possibility of omitted variable bias.
We mitigate this concern, however, by testing for the differential relationship between fi-
nancial structure and average size of financial institutions, on the one hand, and access
to external finance by firms in countries at different levels of GDP per capita, firms of
3See Armendariz and Morduch (2005) for a survey.
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different sizes and firms in industries with different financing needs. It is important to
stress, however, that we do not interpret our findings as causal relationships.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
data sources and variables we use. Section 4.3 presents methodology and section 4.4 our
results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data
We use data from two main sources to construct our sample. We use the Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP) reports, which are jointly prepared by the IMF and World
Bank,4 to construct our measures of the importance or asset share and average size of
different segments of the financial system. We use firm-level data from the World Bank’s
Enterprise Surveys to construct measures of firms’ access to and use of financial services.
Since there is limited overlap between the two datasets, we end up with a total of 54
sample countries and up to 50 countries per regression. All our countries are developing
or emerging countries, with 19 countries in Europe and Central Asia, 10 countries in Latin
America, 23 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 2 countries in East Asia and Pacific.
The level of economic development, as measured by GDP per capita (in constant 2000
US$), varies significantly across our sample countries, ranging from US$ 134 in Malawi to
US$ 7,229 in Uruguay.
Established in 1999, the FSAP is a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of a country’s
financial sector. Historically, full FSAP updates take place about every four to seven years
in any given country. Among other things, the reports generally include a table that reports
on the country’s financial structure broken down into institutional categories such as banks,
insurance companies or pension funds. The aggregation level of institutional categories
varies across reports. There is no standardized categorization of institutions; while one
report may have “banks” as one institutional category, another report may have “private
banks” and “state-owned banks” as institutional categories instead, which combined would
be equivalent to the category “banks” in the former report. The table typically provides
the following information for each institutional category: number of institutions, assets in
(mostly) local currency units, assets as a percentage of total financial sector assets and
assets as percentage of GDP. Note that not all reports provide data in all four categories
4To be exact, FSAP is a joint undertaking of the World Bank and the IMF in developing and emerging
market countries and of the IMF alone in advanced economies.
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and while reports generally include a couple of years of historical data they may record
data in one category for one year but not the next and often data just for one or two years
are reported.5 Using this financial structure information, we build a database from all
financial structure information reported in table form in FSAP reports from the beginning
of the program until mid-2009.
For some countries, more than one FSAP report is available. Unfortunately, the report-
ing structure is almost never the same as in the previous report(s) for the same country
and cross-checks of the data revealed that the reported information is not even necessarily
consistent across reports for the same country. We therefore assume that the most re-
cent report contains the most accurate information and only keep observations from the
most recent report available. Our final database consists of an unbalanced panel for 89
countries over the years 1995-2008. We convert any variables in local currency units into
2000 constant U.S. dollars using exchange rates from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics.
While we have data available for a broader array of institutions, we focus on three
types. First, low-end financial institutions (low-end NBFIs) which include credit unions,
building societies, community banks, cooperatives, micro-finance institutions, cash lenders,
mutual banks, postal banks, rural banks, savings and loans institutions, and thrift banks.
This category is supposed to capture non-bank institutions that serve the low-end of the
market, including SMEs. Second, specialized non-bank financial institutions (specialized
NBFIs) which comprise – among others – finance companies, factoring companies, banks
specialized in housing, merchant banks, and special credit institutions. This category
is supposed to capture non-bank financial institutions that specialize in certain lending
activities that might be more attractive for SMEs, such as leasing and factoring. The final
category is deposit-taking or commercial banks (banks).6
We use the FSAP data to construct two indicators. The asset share is calculated
as each type’s assets relative to the sum of low-end financial institutions, specialized non-
bank financial institutions and commercial bank financial assets and gauges the importance
of each segment within the financial system. The three asset shares add up to 100.7 The
5See Appendix Table 4.A below for data availability across countries and categories.
6We carefully screen and group institutions into those three categories as applicable to arrive at com-
parable institutional categories across countries.We believe that by focusing on those three aggregate
categories (as opposed to more detailed categories) we can best construct comparable categories across
countries despite potential regulatory differences. Furthermore, by focusing on developing countries we
also minimize regulatory differences.
7There are other categories such as insurance companies or pension funds that we do not include in
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average size is computed by dividing the total amount of assets per category by the number
of institutions per category.
Both indicators vary widely across our sample countries. The share of banks varies from
almost 99 percent in Ukraine to 61 percent in Colombia. The share of specialized lenders
varies from 38 percent in Colombia to less than one percent in Senegal, Ukraine, Bolivia,
and Madagascar. The share of low-end financial institutions varies from 21 percent in
Burkina Faso to less than one-half percent in Chile and Latvia. The average size of banks
in ranges from US$ 3.5 billion in Turkey to US$ 10 million in Guinea-Bissau. The average
size of specialized lenders varies from US$ 350 million in Chile to less than US$ 1 million
in Mongolia. The average size of low-end financial institutions varies from US$ 800 million
in Turkey to less than US$ 1 million in Mongolia.
We combine the financial structure data with data from the World Bank’s Enterprise
Surveys. The Enterprise Surveys collect firm level-data from key manufacturing and service
sectors in over 120 countries since 2002.8 Countries are surveyed every three to four years
but not simultaneously. To ensure data consistency and inter-country comparability we
only use data from countries in the standardized dataset 2006-2010 which contains data
for 100 countries.9 The number of firms surveyed in each country depends on the size of
the economy with more firms being surveyed in larger economies and is chosen to make
each country’s sample representative of the non-agricultural private economy.
From the Enterprise Surveys we construct three access to and use of financial services
indicators: (i) account is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an account at the
time of the survey and zero otherwise; (ii) overdraft is a dummy variable equal to one if the
firm has an overdraft facility at the time of the survey and zero otherwise; and (iii) loan
is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a line of credit or loan from a financial
institution at the time of survey and zero otherwise.
We match the two samples by building a cross-sectional dataset that matches the firm
characteristics with the average of the available data from the FSAP reports. Maximum
country overlap between the two data sources is 54 countries with over 25,000 firm level
observations. Appendix Table 4.A lists the countries in our sample, a breakdown of the
firm distribution by country, and by-country summary statistics of the FSAP variables we
will use in the subsequent analysis. Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics and Table 4.2
our analysis.
8Only private sector firms are surveyed; fully state-owned firms are excluded.
9Due to changes in the questionnaire data from the earlier years cannot be easily compared to data
collected in the more recent years. In the six instances where multiple years of data are available for a
given country, we keep only the most recent year of data.
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correlations on the country level.
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 show that over 90 percent of firms in our sample
have an account. This percentage, however, varies significantly across countries. While in
the Slovak Republic 20.8 percent of firms have an account, 99.8 percent do so in Croatia.10
Almost 50 percent of firms have an overdraft facility and 45 percent have a loan. Behind
this average, however, are again large cross-country variations. While only 1.3 percent of
firms have an overdraft facility and 3.1 percent a loan in Guinea-Bissau, 87.5 percent and
74.5 percent, respectively, do so in Chile.
We also use information from the Enterprise Surveys to control for firm-level charac-
teristics that might affect a firm’s ease of access to financial products. In particular, we
construct dummy variables for firm size (small, up to 19 employees; medium, 20-99 em-
ployees; large, 100 or more employees), being a subsidiary, and being publicly listed, and
control for the percentage of the firm owned by private foreign owners and the percentage
of a firm owned by the state, as well as the firm’s age. The descriptive statistics in Table 4.1
show that 47.4 percent of all firms are small, 34.3 percent are medium-sized and 18.3 per-
cent large. 13 percent are subsidiaries of other firms, and 6.2 percent are publicly listed.
The foreign ownership share is, on average, 10.7 percent, while the average government
ownership is 0.7 percent. On average, firms are 17.5 years old.
We control for the level of development and the depth of the financial sector using
the logarithm of GDP per capita and credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP,
respectively. The data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The
rationale for including credit to the private sector as control is that, beyond the general
level of development, financial structure might be a function of the depth of the financial
sector. The average depth of the financial sector in our sample is 25.6 percent, ranging
from just over 2 percent in Guinea-Bissau to 80.3 percent in Chile.
Finally, we control for industry-level variation in the need for external finance. Specif-
ically, we use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) indicator on the fraction of investment that
cannot be financed through internal cash flows, computed over the 1980s for listed firms
in the United States. The underlying assumption in Rajan and Zingales and our work
is that for technological reasons some industries depend more heavily on external finance
than others and that this industry variation does not differ across countries. We use the
self-reported industry categorization by firms in the Enterprise Surveys to match with the
Rajan and Zingales classification. Since this variable is only available for manufacturing
10Our regression results are robust to the exclusion of the Slovak Republic.
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industries, we lose about a half of our sample. The average fraction of external need for
finance across our sample is 0.29, varying from -0.45 (tobacco) to 1.14 (plastic products).
The correlations in Table 4.2 suggest that there is no systematic relationship between
the country-level metrics of financial segment size. Not surprisingly, however, the average
asset size variables of some of the institutional categories are positively and significantly
correlated. The depth of the financial system as measured by private credit as percentage
of GDP is, as expected, positively and significantly correlated with the mean asset size
of all institutional categories except low-end NBFIs. There are no significant correlations
between the asset shares of the different segments of the financial system and our access to
finance variables. There are, however, significant correlations between the average size of
financial institutions and the access to finance variables. Countries with larger specialized
lenders and larger banks have a higher share of firms with overdraft facilities and loans.
There are also significant positive correlations between the depth of the financial system
and all three measures of access to finance. Many of the firm characteristics are also
correlated with each other. Countries with more small firms, for instance, have younger
and fewer listed firms. Lastly, our access indicators are also significantly correlated with
our industry indicator of external dependence, with firms in industries more reliant on
external finance being more likely to have an account, a loan or an overdraft.
4.3 Methodology
To estimate the effect of the mean asset size and assets as share of total assets of different
types of financial institutions on the use of financial services we use the following empirical
baseline specification:
Financial Servicesij = α + β1 Medium Firmij + β2 Large Firmij + β3 Subsidiaryij
+ β4 Publicly Listedij + β5 Foreign-Ownedij
+ β6 State-Ownedij + β7 Firm Ageij + β8 Firm Sectorij
+ β9 GDP per Capitaj + β10 Private Creditj
+ β11 Financial Sector Indicatorj + εij (4.1)
where Financial Services indicates one of our three dependent variables measuring the use
of financial services of firm i in country j. Because of the binary nature of the dependent
variables we use a probit model to estimate the specification. Financial Sector Indicator is
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our independent variable of interest that varies across regressions: average size or assets as
share of financial sector assets per the institutional categories low-end financial institutions,
specialized lenders, and banks. Standard errors are clustered at the country level in all
specifications so that we allow for correlation of error terms across firms within a country
but not across countries. It is important to note that our regressions imply empirical
associations, but not necessarily causality.
In a second step, we want to assess whether the relationship between financial struc-
ture and access to financial services varies across countries with different levels of economic
development, across firms of different sizes and across industries with different needs for
external finance. We therefore interact, in separate regressions, the financial sector indica-
tor with GDP per capita, with dummy variables indicating that the firm is small, medium
or large size, or with the Rajan and Zingales (1998) indicator of external dependence. In
the case of interactions with size dummies, we do not include the financial sector indicator
by itself, while in the case of interaction regressions with external dependence we include
both external dependence and its interaction with the financial sector indicator. Since Ai
and Norton (2003) have shown that it might be difficult to interpret the marginal effects
of interaction terms in non-linear models, we run these regressions with OLS.
4.4 Results
Tables 4.3 and 4.6 report our main results using asset share and average size as financial
sector indicators, respectively, while Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and Tables 4.7 and 4.8 report the
regressions with interaction terms. Tables 4.4 and 4.7 each report the coefficient estimates,
while Tables 4.5 and 4.8 report the partial effects of those coefficient estimates at the 25th,
50th and 75th percentiles of GDP per capita and the external dependence ratio. In the
interest of space and readability, we report regression coefficients of all variables in Table
4.3, while in all subsequent tables we report just the coefficients of interest, namely the
coefficients of the Financial Sector Indicator and interaction terms. Due to data limitations
on the average size variables the country sample and the number of firms do not stay
constant across specifications in Tables 4.6 to 4.8.11
11The dependent variables in Tables 4.3 to 4.5 allow for a balanced panel across countries by construc-
tion.
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4.4.1 Asset Share Across Different Segments
The results in Table 4.3 suggest that there is no significant relationship between the im-
portance of low-end financial institutions and firms’ access to financial services. However,
we find that firms in countries with a larger share of specialized lenders are more likely
to have an overdraft and a loan, and these relationships are significant at the 5 percent
level. We also find that a larger share of banks in total financial assets is associated with
lower use of financial services by enterprises. The share of bank assets in total financial
assets enters negatively and significantly at the 10 percent level in the regression of account
and overdraft and negatively and significantly at the 1 percent level in the regression of
loans. Overall, the results thus suggest that specialized lenders are an especially important
segment in the financial system when it comes to providing access to credit for firms.
The coefficient estimates on our control variables are largely as expected and hold across
the three categories of financial institutions. Firms in countries with higher GDP per capita
as well as medium and large firms are more likely to have an account, overdraft facility,
and loan. In more financially developed countries firms are more likely to have an account
and loan, however this holds only for the regressions controlling for the share of specialized
lenders and banks. Firms that are subsidiaries are more likely to have an account and an
overdraft facility, while there appears to be no significant relationship between a firm being
publicly listed and its use of financial services. As the percentage of foreign ownership in a
firm increases firms are more likely to have an account. However, they are also less likely to
have a loan. Firms are also less likely to have a loan as the percentage of state ownership
in a firm increases suggesting that in both cases alternative financing options might be
available to such firms. Finally, the older firms are the more likely they are to have an
account and overdraft facility.
The results of Table 4.4 show that our results from above largely hold once we interact
the asset shares with level of economic development, level of external dependence and firm
size even though there is some variation in significance across countries with different levels
of GDP per capita and firms of different size. The interactions with GDP per capita show
that the relationship between the importance of low-end financial institutions, specialized
lenders and banks varies significantly across countries with different levels of economic
development. While the asset share of low-end financial institutions enters positively and
significantly in the regressions of account and overdraft, its interaction with GDP per
capita enters negatively and significantly. When we calculate the partial effects (Table
4.5) for the share of low-end financial institutions at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of
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GDP per capita (equivalent to the GDP per capita of Mongolia, Guatemala, and Brazil,
respectively) in our sample we find that only the relation between the share of low-end
financial institutions and having an account or loan at the 25th percentile of GDP per
capita is significant and positive, while the relation between the share of low-end financial
institutions and the share of firms with overdraft is not significant at any level of GDP
per capita. Thus only in low-income countries do firms benefit – in terms of better access
to financial services – from a higher share of low-end financial institutions. Neither the
level of the share of specialized financial institutions nor its interaction with GDP per
capita enters significantly. The partial effects calculations in Table 4.5 suggest that the
importance of specialized financial institutions only has a statistically significant impact
in the case of overdrafts and loans for countries at the 50th percentile of GDP per capita
where the impact is significant and positive. They also have a positive and significant
impact on account for countries at the 75th percentile. Finally, the relationship between
banks’ importance and firms’ use of overdrafts and loans is negative and significant only
in countries at the 25th and 50th percentile of GDP per capita. The relationship between
banks’ importance and firms’ use of accounts is also negative and significant at the 50th
percentile of GDP, but somewhat surprisingly not at the 25th percentile. The negative
effect of bank dominance is thus concentrated in low and lower-middle income countries.
When interacting the relative importance of different segments of the financial system
with the external dependence across different sectors, none of the interaction terms enter
significantly. While the partial effects calculations suggest some significant relationships,
the relation between the relative size of different segments of the financial system and
access to finance by enterprises generally does not vary across sectors with different needs
for external finance. However, there is one exception: a more prominent role of low-end
financial institutions helps firms that rely less on external finance to obtain loans with the
relationship turning insignificant at the 75th percentile of external dependence.
When interacting the financial sector indicators with firm size dummies, we cannot find
any significant relationship between the relative importance of low-end financial institutions
and access to finance and no differential effect across firms of different sizes, with one
exception. Specifically, the likelihood of having an account increases with a higher share of
low-end financial institutions for medium and large firms, while none of the other firm-size
interactions enters significantly at the 5 percent level. In the case of specialized lenders,
we find that a more prominent role is associated with a higher likelihood of obtaining an
overdraft facility or loan for small and medium-sized firms while the relationship is not
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significant for large firms. At the same time, a more prominent role of banks is associated
with the opposite effect, that is, a lower likelihood of obtaining an overdraft facility or loan
for small and medium-sized firms, and again an insignificant effect for large firms.
4.4.2 Average Size of Financial Institutions
The regressions in Table 4.6 suggest that smaller low-end financial institutions are asso-
ciated with a higher probability of firms having an account. On the other hand, having
larger specialized lenders is associated with a higher probability of having an overdraft
facility and loan. The average size of banks is not associated with access to finance.
The coefficient estimates in the regressions reported in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show a non-
linear relationship between the average size of different financial institutions and access to
finance across countries at different levels of GDP per capita, across firms of different sizes,
and across different external financing needs. Overall, they suggest that larger low-end and
specialized financial institutions are better at providing especially firms in countries with
low levels of development with access to credit. The message on the relationship between
the size of financial institutions and firms’ access to financial services is thus nuanced:
it is larger institutions within the segment of the financial system that is traditionally
thought of to be closer to the client – either because of their organizational structure or
specialized products – that ease access to finance. At the same time, larger specialized
financial institutions and banks are related to better financial access for small firms.
In particular, larger low-end financial institutions are associated with a higher likelihood
of use of an overdraft facility and loans across countries although the partial effects diminish
as the GDP per capita increases. While the coefficient on average size enters positively
and significantly, its interaction enters negatively and significantly in the regressions of
overdrafts and loans. Assessing the partial effects, we find that the average size of low-
end institutions has a positive relationship with the likelihood of having an overdraft at
all levels of GDP per capita, but decreasingly so as we move up the ladder of economic
development and indeed turning insignificant for countries at the 75th percentile of GDP.
We do not find any significant relationship between the average size of low-end institutions
and the likelihood of having an account at any level of GDP per capita. The interaction
regressions with the external dependence variable are not significant implying that there
is no differential effect of the average size of low-end lenders in term of GDP per capita
across industries with different external financing needs. The negative relationship of the
average size of low-end financial institutions with the use of accounts holds across firms of
104 The Role of Institutions in International Finance
all sizes, though it is strongest for small enterprises.
A larger average size of specialized lenders continues to be positively associated with the
likelihood of having an overdraft or loan across all countries, while there is no significant
relation with the use of accounts. This positive relationship holds for firms of all sizes
and is strongest for small firms, with the exception of being insignificant for large firms in
the loan column. The partial effects calculations for the external dependence ratio suggest
that there is no differential effect of the average size of specialized lenders across industries
with different external financing needs.
Larger banks are associated with a positive relation of average size of banks with the
likelihood of having an account at the 25th and 50th percentiles of GDP per capita, but
not at the 75th percentile. We also find evidence that larger banks are associated with
a higher likelihood of overdrafts and loans for small firms. The interaction with external
finance is significant at the 5 percent level for likelihood of having an account and an
overdraft facility. However, when combined with the level effect we see from the results in
Table 4.8 that the overall effect of banks is insignificant across the different percentiles of
the external dependence ratio.
4.4.3 Robustness Tests
In unreported robustness tests, we gauge the sensitivity of the interaction regressions of
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and Tables 4.7 and 4.8 to the estimation technique. Specifically, we
find that our main findings hold when using non-linear estimation techniques as in Tables
4.3 and 4.6. We also test for the robustness of our results in Table 4.6 using a constant
country sample of 29 to confirm that our results are not driven by varying country samples
across the three institutional categories.
4.5 Conclusion
Using unique data on the financial structure and the average size of different financial
institutions, this chapter explores the implications of the relative importance and average
size of institutions that cater specifically to SMEs compared to the importance of banks
and their average size.
Our results indicate that the dominance of banks in the financial systems of most
developing countries appears to be rather detrimental for firms’ access to financial services.
We do not find any evidence that smaller institutions – be they banks, specialized lenders
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or low-end financial institutions – are better in providing access to finance for enterprises.
Critically, however, we find that “one size does not fit all.” Low-end financial institutions
and specialized lenders seem especially appropriate to ease access to finance in low-income
countries. Similarly, larger low-end financial institutions and banks seem to ease access to
finance only at low levels of GDP per capita. We also find variation across firm sizes, not
so much in the importance of different segments of the financial system, but rather in the
relationship with the average size. We do not find that larger low-end financial institutions
hurt small firms’ access to credit. Even more important, larger specialized lenders and
banks are actually associated with a greater likelihood of loan and overdraft use by small
firms. We do not find that some of our effects are stronger for industries more reliant on
external finance.
Our results, while tentative, send important policy messages. First, the dominance
of banks in most financial systems across the developing world is indeed associated with
the limited access to financial services by enterprises. This calls for diversification and
more competition within the financial system, including from low-end financial institutions
and specialized lenders. Second, smaller financial institutions are not necessarily better
equipped to improve access to financial services by enterprises. While certainly not a
call for consolidation, this again implies a diversified financial system with institutions of
different sizes.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A. Firm-level Characteristics
Dummy==1 if firm has account 24531 0.9044 0.2940 0 1
Dummy==1 if firm has overdraft facility 23952 0.4891 0.4999 0 1
Dummy==1 if firm has loan 24336 0.4474 0.4972 0 1
Dummy==1 if firm size small 24659 0.4742 0.4993 0 1
Dummy==1 if firm size medium 24659 0.3426 0.4746 0 1
Dummy==1 if firm size large 24659 0.1831 0.3868 0 1
Dummy==1 if subsidiary 24659 0.1305 0.3368 0 1
Dummy==1 if publicly listed 24659 0.0575 0.2327 0 1
% of firm owned by foreign investor 24659 10.7282 29.1665 0 100
% of firm owned by government 24659 0.7362 6.9009 0 100
Firm age in years 24659 17.5148 16.0739 0 310
B. Industry-level Characteristics
External dependence ratio 28 0.2871 0.3680 -0.45 1.14
C. Country-level Characteristics
GDP per capita (log) 54 6.9650 1.2173 4.8947 8.8859
Private Credit (% GDP) 54 25.6340 17.4473 2.0892 80.3032
Mean asset size, low-end NBFI (in constant 2000 bn US$) 36 0.0322 0.1357 0.0000 0.8175
Mean asset size, specialized NBFI (in constant 2000 bn US$) 33 0.0578 0.0903 0.0004 0.3555
Mean asset size, banks (in constant 2000 bn US$) 50 0.5419 0.7633 0.0099 3.4644
Asset share, low-end NBFI (%) 33 4.3890 5.2283 0.0564 21.7718
Asset share, specialized NBFI (%) 33 6.5246 7.5962 0.2727 38.0821
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NBFI, low-end -0.574*** -0.011 -0.087
(0.209) (0.274) (0.153)
N 18,642 18,238 18,445
# countries 36 36 36
Pseudo Adj. R-squared 0.076 0.110 0.108
NBFI, specialized 0.922 3.159*** 1.050**
(0.869) (0.781) (0.533)
N 17,998 17,566 17,799
# countries 33 33 33
Pseudo Adj. R-squared 0.063 0.135 0.107
Banks 0.005 0.143 0.025
(0.075) (0.102) (0.046)
N 22,554 21,983 22,354
# countries 50 50 50
Pseudo Adj. R-squared 0.058 0.104 0.108
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions control for the unreported variables logarithm of
GDP per capita, private credit, dummy variables for size
(medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm be-
ing publicly listed, the percentage of the firm owned by foreign
investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, and
the firm age in years as well as industry dummies. Errors are
clustered at the country level.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from FSAP reports,
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Table 4.A: Asset Share and Asset Size by Country
Asset Share Mean Assets in bn US$ (constant)
low-end specialized Banks low-end specialized Banks Number
Country NBFI NFBI NBFI NFBI of Firms
Belarus 0.430 273
Benin 0.115 150
Bolivia 15.12 0.34 84.54 0.024 0.021 0.410 613
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.19 3.24 94.58 0.003 0.039 0.099 361
Botswana 0.55 12.47 86.98 0.001 0.156 0.511 342
Brazil 0.83 5.52 93.64 0.003 0.180 2.668 1802
Bulgaria 0.017 0.665 288
Burkina Faso 21.77 3.24 74.99 0.001 0.010 0.100 394
Cameroon 4.66 10.64 84.70 363
Chile 0.45 1.52 98.03 0.004 0.355 2.481 1017
Colombia 0.74 38.08 61.17 0.024 0.327 0.931 1000
Cote d’Ivoire 1.51 3.73 94.76 526
Croatia 0.026 1.054 633
Czech Republic 1.356 250
Ecuador 4.78 5.89 89.32 0.009 0.013 0.217 658
Gabon 5.49 5.01 89.49 0.005 0.010 0.187 179
Georgia 0.029 373
Ghana 3.35 4.34 92.31 0.000 0.004 0.129 494
Guatemala 0.016 0.385 522
Guinea-Bissau 0.010 159
Honduras 6.31 1.67 92.02 0.072 0.006 0.174 436
Hungary 6.01 11.79 82.21 0.015 0.034 1.325 291
Kazakhstan 0.016 0.093 544
Kenya 17.09 3.09 79.82 0.000 0.042 0.127 657
Kyrgyz Republic 0.000 0.016 235
Latvia 0.06 6.07 93.87 0.000 0.040 0.616 271
Macedonia, FYR 1.27 1.51 97.21 0.003 0.005 0.147 366
Madagascar 5.33 0.27 94.40 0.007 0.002 0.171 445
Malawi 2.88 1.97 95.15 0.000 0.007 0.060 150
Mali 0.138 490
Mauritius 0.68 5.20 94.12 0.022 0.160 0.396 398
Moldova 0.000 0.027 363
Mongolia 0.79 3.49 95.73 0.000 0.000 0.086 362
Montenegro 0.008 0.050 116
Mozambique 2.64 14.21 83.15 0.008 0.075 0.225 479
Namibia 0.000 0.565 329
Niger 0.041 150
Paraguay 11.43 7.86 80.71 0.001 0.012 0.137 613
Peru 3.39 4.36 92.25 0.018 0.086 1.239 632
Philippines 10.34 3.15 86.51 0.007 0.023 1.274 1326
Poland 0.010 1.886 455
Rwanda 5.96 23.35 70.69 212
Senegal 2.05 0.65 97.30 506
Serbia 0.011 0.145 388
Sierra Leone 0.024 150
Slovak Republic 1.584 275
Tajikistan 0.000 0.032 360
Tanzania 0.89 7.06 92.05 0.000 0.013 0.109 419
Togo 0.064 155
Turkey 1.94 3.03 95.03 0.818 0.033 3.464 1152
Uganda 0.98 4.33 94.68 0.000 0.008 0.078 563
Ukraine 0.64 0.46 98.89 0.000 0.002 0.133 851
Uruguay 1.66 15.13 83.21 0.070 0.181 0.833 621
Zambia 1.03 2.64 96.33 0.000 0.003 0.059 484
Total 25641
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from FSAP reports and Enterprise Surveys as described in the text.
